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The Cold War defined a state of conflict between the U.S., China, and the Soviet 
Union during the nuclear age that followed World War II.  During the Cold War the 
United States practiced a foreign policy that was episodic in nature as the great nations 
recruited the developing countries of the Third World to carry on their ideological 
struggles.  This policy meant that the U.S. would aggressively intervene during periods of 
war in developing countries in order to prevent the spread of communism.  Yet, after the 
episode ended, the U.S. would quickly vacate the region and move on to other areas to 
fight its Cold War battles and counter communist advances throughout the Third World. 
The détente initiative of President Richard M. Nixon demonstrates this episodic 
tendency in U.S. foreign policy.  Détente provided the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union 
with a platform to negotiate their differences, along with economic, political, and military 
inducements that were mutually beneficial to all parties.  Détente began as Nixon 
established a diplomatic opening to China in 1971, with the assistance of Pakistan’s 
President, Yahya Khan, to act as an intermediary between the U.S. and China.   
The U.S. had not given much attention to Pakistan previously, but détente caused 
Nixon to focus his attention sharply on Pakistan.  As plans were underway for Nixon to 
visit China, Pakistan became involved in a civil war.  Yahya Khan initiated a violent 
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suppression of the Bengali people in East Pakistan which led to atrocities committed 
against his own people.  Nixon remained silent on these issues in order to protect détente.  
Yahya’s atrocities outraged in the international community, and India eventually 
intervened on behalf of the Bengali people, leading to war between Pakistan and India.  
This war started the South Asia Crisis. 
This thesis argues that détente caused the South Asia Crisis, that the crisis 
threatened to destroy détente, and that détente itself brought an end to the crisis.  The 
U.S. and China were allied with Pakistan, and the Soviet Union was allied with India.  
Nixon’s failure to curb Yahya’s atrocities led to Indian intervention.  The ensuing crisis 
threatened to ruin détente as Nixon confronted a Soviet/Indian alliance that was 
determined to crush all of Pakistan.  This essay argues that Nixon made the correct 
assessment of Indian/Soviet intentions during the South Asia Crisis.  The regional 
conflict between India and Pakistan escalated into a potential Cold War conflict between 
the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union.  Nixon confronted the Soviets and warned of U.S. 
intervention in the war on behalf of Pakistan, thereby risking détente.  The Soviet Union 
desired to insure that détente remained intact based on its own interests in potential gains, 
and agreed to use its influence to restrain India and end the crisis.   
The South Asia Crisis demonstrates the episodic nature of U.S. relations with the 
Third World during the Cold War.  With détente secured, Nixon quickly turned his 
attention away from Pakistan.  Once the U.S. was convinced that the Soviet-backed 
Indian military would not continue its military campaign against Pakistan, the U.S. 
quickly moved on to other Cold War concerns.  This became a pattern of U.S. action 
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The Episodic Nature of U.S. Relations with the Third World  
in General and Pakistan in Particular 
 
The Cold War grew out of World War II tensions between the Soviet Union and 
the United States.  Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union sought to expand their political 
ideologies throughout the post-war world.  The developing nations of the world became 
indirectly involved in the Cold War through their associations with the United States, the 
Soviet Union, and Communist China.  These developing nations, known as the Third 
World, often became allied with the major Cold War powers.  Through these alliances the 
great nations of the post-war world promoted their political ideologies (communism or 
capitalism) and recruited Third World peoples to join them in accomplishing their 
objectives. 
The primary question this thesis seeks to answer is how the Cold War shaped the 
way the United States approached the Third World.  The Cold War caused the U.S. to 
address the Third World based on American concerns over communist expansion.  The 
U.S. desired to contain communism as much as possible which led to a get-in and get-out 
strategy in the Third World that was based on addressing the multiple threats of 
communist expansion around the globe, and the wars associated with them.  This resulted 
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in an episodic pattern of U.S. involvement in the Third World during the Cold War.  The 
U.S. did not practice a policy of long-term investment in the Third World (except perhaps 
when significant American economic interests were involved).  Essentially, American 
political involvement limited itself to a get-in and get-out approach.  When American 
Cold War interests peaked in a country or a region, then America would be heavily 
involved there for a season, but when the episode of crisis or conflict passed, the United 
States would then move on to the next location of Soviet or Chinese global activity to act 
as a wall against communist advance.   
After the communist takeover of China in 1949, the United States broke off all 
diplomatic ties with the country.  Two decades later, President Richard M. Nixon desired 
to change this policy through an initiative known as détente.  Its goals were to improve 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and China, to negotiate reductions in nuclear 
armaments, and to reduce Cold War tensions as much as possible.  Détente could not 
bring peace to the world, but it could enable Cold War adversaries to address their issues 
in a new context that involved less tension between them.  As was true in each Cold War 
episode, the Americans, the Soviets, and the Chinese would continue to promote their 
individual ideologies in spite of détente.  Nixon understood this was the nature of global 
Cold War politics and he accepted this as reality.  He was willing to accept the Soviets 
and the Chinese as they were, without attempting to change them.  Détente sought 
restraint rather than confrontation and provided the means for dialogue among Cold War 
enemies with the understanding that each party had a clear agenda it consistently pursued.  
Nixon was willing to work in this context with the Soviet Union and China without 
insisting each country modify its agenda.  Instead, détente would find ways to 
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accommodate mutually shared interests, to negotiate on interests that were unrealistic or 
inflammatory, and to attempt to make the post-war world less volatile.    
Tension between the Soviet Union and Communist China was a situation Nixon 
wanted to take advantage of.  Nixon’s combined visits to both Chinese Party Chairman 
Mao Tse-tung and Soviet General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev in their respective 
countries in early 1972 were crucial to détente.  Nixon understood that his visit to China 
would soften Soviet stubbornness when it came to arms negotiations.  Building 
diplomatic bridges to both countries simultaneously would provide the necessary 
leverage for dialogue to begin between all three superpowers.  This would enable the 
beginning of détente to take place.  Nixon understood that the link to China was the key 
to détente with the Russians.  American relations with the Soviets could be greatly 
influenced by American relations with the Chinese.  Nixon knew that he could capitalize 
politically on Chinese and Soviet suspicions toward one another due to his visits as they 
wondered what secret negotiations might be taking place.
1
   
Nixon’s first step in beginning his détente initiative was to establish a diplomatic 
opening with the Chinese after two decades of diplomatic silence between the U.S. and 
China.  To do this he needed an intermediary in order to gain the trust of the Chinese.  
This opportunity presented itself through Pakistan.  Pakistan’s President, Yahya Khan, 
provided the best channel for Nixon to establish détente with the Chinese due to 
Pakistan’s alliances with both the U.S. and China, but Yahya was attempting to restore 
order to a politically volatile situation inside Pakistan that threatened the stability of the 
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country.  The political problems of Pakistan had already caused the previous president, 
Ayub Khan, to step down in March, 1969.  The political situation evolved into a civil war 
in the eastern wing of a geographically and politically divided Pakistan that would 
threaten Nixon’s plans.  Pakistan’s civil war would send a flood of refugees into 
neighboring India, which caused India to intervene, resulting in the South Asia Crisis. 
This essay argues that détente caused the South Asia Crisis, that the crisis itself 
nearly destroyed détente, and that ultimately détente was the reason the crisis ended.  For 
a brief four week period in the late fall of 1971, détente triggered an Indian invasion of 
East Pakistan, but also enabled Nixon to end the crisis in less than a month.  The South 
Asia Crisis had the potential to completely end détente and in a worst case scenario it 
could have triggered a world war based on the various alliances involved.  For a few 
weeks in November and December of 1971, America, the Soviet Union, and Communist 
China had their eyes fixed on South Asia in a Cold War episode involving all three 
nuclear superpowers.  As the Soviets gave abundant military support to India, the U.S. 
wrestled with how to help Pakistan during a regional war that contained global 
implications.   
  Nixon’s détente initiative caused the South Asia Crisis.  When the civil war between 
East and West Pakistan developed, Nixon came under domestic pressure to intervene and 
help the East Pakistani refugees.  Anything Nixon did in a public platform that was 
critical of Pakistan could threaten détente, so he remained silent.
2
  Nixon was also 
determined to avoid involvement in another Asian civil war.  In order to preserve his 
diplomatic channel to Peking, Nixon provided U.S. aid for Pakistani refugees, but 
maintained his silence over atrocities that were being committed by the leadership of 
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Pakistan during the civil war.  India asked Nixon to use his influence with Pakistan to 
curb the violence being perpetrated upon the Bengali people by Yahya’s rampaging 
military, but Nixon refused in order to protect détente.  India then began to equip and 
train the Bengali resistance, and ultimately went to war on their behalf.
3
  
The South Asia Crisis threatened to end détente as it developed into a significant 
Cold War confrontation between the great powers.  The South Asia Crisis took place 
while détente was still in its formative stages.  Détente remained fragile and American 
international relationships with China and the Soviet Union were tentative throughout 
Pakistan’s civil war and its subsequent war with India.  Initially, Nixon desired to protect 
détente by avoiding public comment on Yahya’s atrocities in East Pakistan, but Indian 
intervention escalated the conflict.  Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, 
Henry A. Kissinger, then made a veiled threat to India of a U.S., China, and Pakistani 
alliance against India should it decide to invade East Pakistan to help the Bengali 
resistance.  This was done to pressure India into peace negotiations in order to protect 
détente and restrain any aggressive intentions, but India immediately entered into an 
alliance with the Soviet Union which threatened détente on a much broader scale.  
Tensions between the three major superpowers automatically increased when India 
initiated war with Pakistan.   Due to the alliances involved, détente was placed in 
jeopardy as the U.S., Pakistan, and China opposed the Soviet Union and India.   
The argument put forth here is that Nixon and Kissinger were correct in their 
assessment that India planned to crush all of Pakistan.  The two men feared that an Indian 
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war with Pakistan could threaten not only East Pakistan but West Pakistan as well.  
Nixon and Kissinger believed India planned to defeat Yahya’s forces in East Pakistan and 
then continue into West Pakistan to crush all of Pakistan’s fighting ability and 
permanently cripple the country.  U.S. and Pakistani diplomats, as well as journalists and 
historians, have believed India merely wanted to insure the establishment of an 
independent Bangladesh, protect Pakistani refugees, and restore order in the region.  This 
would be India’s publicly declared position as well.  Yet, Nixon and Kissinger were 
convinced that India wanted to crush all of Pakistan’s military once war in the East was 
won.  This would insure India’s security and guarantee that Pakistan could never again 
raise a hand against it.
4
   
Détente brought an end to the South Asia Crisis as Nixon confronted the Soviets.  
The Soviet Union was largely responsible for India’s emboldened state of aggression 
against Pakistan during the South Asia Crisis.  As the crisis escalated Nixon explained to 
the Russians that Soviet support for India against an American-allied Pakistan could 
threaten the relationship between America and the Soviet Union.  During the South Asia 
Crisis, Nixon was forced to risk détente and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the 
Soviets.  Nixon was already scheduled to meet with Brezhnev in Moscow in the spring of 
1972 when the Soviets blatantly armed India against Pakistan in the summer of 1971.  
Nixon could not restrain Soviet ambitions in South Asia until he threatened U.S. military 
intervention and warned that Soviet actions could endanger détente.  Moscow desired to 
participate in detente for several reasons.  The Soviet Union wanted to impede a possible 
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Chinese/American agreement aimed against it.
5
  They also desired a means to limit 
American production and proliferation of nuclear technologies.  The Soviets did not want 
to see Germany building a significant military once again, and “were intent on reaching 
agreements on troop levels in central Europe.”
6
  “Moscow also expected détente to lead 
to expanded U.S./Soviet trade, especially in grain sales, which it badly needed to feed its 
people and others in Eastern Europe.”
7
  After Nixon’s warning that détente was at risk, 
the Soviet Union agreed to use its influence to restrain India once East Pakistan was 
defeated.  Continuing the war into West Pakistan would be avoided in order to protect 
Soviet interests in détente.  In this way détente brought an end to the South Asia Crisis. 
A number of U.S. and Pakistani officials believed that the South Asia Crisis was 
merely a regional conflict with little Cold War significance.  India would assert that its 
invasion of East Pakistan held no motive beyond relieving the suffering of the Bengali 
people at the hands of Pakistan’s military, establishing an independent homeland for 
them, and stopping the flow of refugees into India.  Subsequent historical scholarship has 
taken these claims at face value and has therefore not viewed the South Asia Crisis as a 
significant Cold War event.  Major Cold War historical works often omit the South Asia 
Crisis or minimize it, choosing instead to focus on an alleged overreaction to events by 
Nixon and Kissinger.  Yet, the view that India desired to seize East Pakistan and then 
crush West Pakistan’s military as well, leaving all of Pakistan crippled and helpless, 
remained the analysis of events according to Nixon and Kissinger.  Nixon justifiably 
opposed India and its Soviet ally, creating a significant Cold War confrontation. 
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The episodic U.S. relationship with Pakistan throughout the Cold War, and the 
American get-in and get-out approach to the Third World caused Nixon and Kissinger to 
seriously underestimate the level of hostility between Pakistan and India.  Nixon and 
Kissinger held a clear picture of themselves as prestigious global statesmen, able to 
overcome Cold War obstacles, and establish a new foreign policy that would guarantee 
their place in history.  Yet, the South Asia Crisis would prove to be a serious challenge to 
their abilities as statesmen, and it regularly threatened to overturn their détente initiative.  
Pakistan and India fought a war in 1947 after the partition of India by the British.  The 
two countries again went to war in 1965, causing a U.S. military embargo of both 
nations.  In 1971 there would be a third India/Pakistan war, and even though Nixon 
understood the history of South Asia, he did not understand the depth of the animosity 
between Pakistan and India or the hostility that it could provoke.   
This thesis makes important contributions toward understanding the often 
episodic and temporary role that Third World countries played in the larger Cold War 
struggles.  The Western democracies of North America and Europe (First World) were 
perpetually engaged in an ideological struggle against the Soviet Union and Communist 
China (Second World) throughout the Cold War.  The Third World was the term given to 
the unaligned developing countries around the globe that were often the poorest among 
nations.  Older historical works did not devote a great deal of attention to the Third 
World when dealing with Cold War history.  The writings of John Lewis Gaddis and 
William Appleman Williams illustrate this.  Gaddis and Williams discuss the causes of 
the Cold War and their arguments demonstrate contrasts between the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union without spending much time as to how the Third World related to larger Cold War 
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struggles.  Their works were designed to define the origins of the Cold War and to outline 
the contrasts in ideologies between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.   
There existed a debate between Gaddis and Williams as to the origins and causes 
of the Cold War, but their discussion of the Third World was minimal.  In his book, We 
Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (1997), Gaddis argued that Stalin and his 
authoritarian regime caused the Cold War.
8
  According to Gaddis it was the expansionist 
agenda and unstable personalities of men like Stalin and Khrushchev that drove the Cold 
War and gave rise to America’s policy of containment.  Gaddis believed that once 
Stalin’s rule was secure and it was clear that the Soviet Union would survive World War 
II, “there was going to be a Cold War whatever the west did,” and it was 
“authoritarianism in general, and Stalin in particular” that caused it.
9
  Gaddis focused on 
the expansionist goals of the Soviet Union, and assumed that America had no such 
ideology.   
On the other hand, Williams, in The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (1959), 
argued that the U.S. also had an expansionist agenda during the Cold War based on a 
global “Open Door” economic policy.  Williams mentioned the Third World only as it 
related to U.S. economic development and potential U.S. exploitation.  The Open Door 
Policy of the United States “was based on an economic definition of the world”
10
 
designed to expand American markets and promote Western ideology.  Williams said 
that, “When an advanced industrial nation plays…a controlling role in the development 
of a weaker economy, then the policy of the more powerful country can …be described 
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  Williams argued that the Soviets wanted to contain American imperialism 
just as the U.S. desired to contain communism.  According to Williams, the expansionist 
policies of the U.S. contributed to the Cold War as much as Soviet expansionist policies.  
America did not practice colonialism the way Europe did before World War I, but, the 
U.S. held to an ideology which insisted “that other people cannot really solve their 
problems and improve their lives unless they go about it in the same way as the United 
States.”
12
  Williams argued that this imposed a subtle imperialistic tendency in that even 
though America did not hold a governing influence over a developing country, it often 
held an ideological influence that remained in the fabric of the culture.  The U.S. had 
traditionally demonstrated generous humanitarianism in its foreign policy, but the policy 
was often undercut by the U.S. trying to make other cultures into the likeness of 
Americans, thereby hindering the right of self-determination in other nations.
13
   
Gaddis and Williams do not discuss the Third World to any great degree.  
Pakistan is rarely mentioned in We Now Know because it was considered largely 
irrelevant to Gaddis as a Cold War participant.  Gaddis mentions the plan of U.S. 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (1953-1959) to bind Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and 
Pakistan firmly to the West, and thereby create a “geostrategic Great Wall” to keep the 
Soviet Union and China “from projecting their influence.”
14
  In this way the U.S. would 
be able to contain communist expansion into the Middle East, and limit the threats to 
freedom posed by the Soviet Union and the Red Chinese.  Apart from this, Pakistan is not 
discussed.  Williams does not mention Pakistan or the South Asia Crisis because The 
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Tragedy of American Diplomacy predated the crisis, and he sought to outline the causes 
of the Cold War more than its relation to the Third World.   
After the turn of the century, Cold War historians began to focus much more 
closely on the role of the Third World in the Cold War.  In The Global Cold War (2005), 
author Odd Arne Westad describes the Cold War as “aggressive containment without a 
state of war” between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
15
  He concentrates on the Third 
World as becoming a central stage during the Cold War, but unlike European 
colonialism, “Moscow’s and Washington’s objectives were not exploitation or 
subjugation, but control and improvement.”
16
  Like the U.S., the Soviets believed theirs 
was a global mission to relieve injustice and oppression.  Based largely on Bolshevik 
successes in 1917, “the Soviet elite firmly believed that socialism would replace 
capitalism as the main international system within a generation.”
17
  Westad “argues that 
the United States and the Soviet Union were driven to intervene in the Third World by 
the ideologies inherent in their politics,”
18
 and that “Washington and Moscow needed to 
change the world in order to prove the universal applicability of their ideologies.”
19
  The 
Stalinist belief that the world was at the brink of a new age in which communism and 
socialism would replace all other economic realities caused the U.S.S.R. to develop an 
aggressive foreign policy to facilitate this perceived inevitability.  The Bolsheviks set up 
the Communist International, or Comintern, as a world-wide organization headquartered 
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in Moscow, to help foster these “inevitable” revolutions that would bring down the 
oppressive regimes of capitalism.
20
 
This ideology propelled the Soviet Union to intervene in South Asia.  Like 
Williams, Westad revealed that the competing ideologies of capitalism and communism 
provoked expansionist agendas in order to validate the conviction of each that they 
possessed the political solution to the needs of the Third World.  It was consistent with 
Soviet ideology to come to the aid of the oppressed and poverty-stricken Bengali people 
of East Pakistan by assisting India as it opposed the oppressive regime of Pakistan’s 
Yahya Khan.  In fact, it was an ideological necessity for the Soviets to intervene.  
Believing that armed resistance brought freedom and justice to oppressed peoples, the 
Soviets invested massive amounts of military hardware in support of India as it fought the 
oppression and brutality toward the Bengali people in East Pakistan.  The Soviet Union 
intervened in the South Asia Crisis to accomplish its Cold War objectives using the Third 
World to provide the platform. 
Westad discussed one of the primary political movements that caused the great 
nations of the Cold War to give greater notice to the Third World.  The 1955 Asian-
African conference in Bandung, Indonesia, was a Third World movement initiated “by 
the leaders of five Asian states: Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Burma, and Sri Lanka.”
21
  The 
Bandung conference demonstrated a show of solidarity among Third World leaders, who 
then called upon the Western powers to exercise restraint and responsibility.  The fact 
that the West had fought two world wars and now possessed massive nuclear armaments 
was worrisome to the Third World.  Bandung also encouraged an attitude of 
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nonalignment in the Third World when it came to reliance on the superpower nations.  
Westad said, “Lecturing the superpowers on the conduct of international relations was a 
powerful sign that the Third World was coming of age.”
22
  Westad quotes Secretary of 
State, John Foster Dulles, as saying, “the scene of the battle between the free world and 
the Communist world was shifting,”
23
 due to the fact that the Third World countries had 
gained the ability to act in unison.  By the late 1950s, the U.S., the Soviet Union, and the 
Communist Chinese grew increasingly interested in the developing countries of the Third 
World as legitimate Cold War allies. 
The Third World provided the stage for the U.S., the Soviet Union, and 
Communist China to wage their Cold War battles using conventional weapons.  
According to Jeremi Suri in Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of 
Détente (2003), the U.S. and the Soviets had concluded a Limited Test Ban Treaty in the 
1960s and had come to a place of coexistence, but coexistence was not the same as 
cooperation.
24
  Washington and Moscow “frequently employed proxies to avoid the risk 
of direct confrontation.”
25
  Each superpower “supported local wars…along capitalist and 
communist lines” among the various states of the Third World.
26
  These interventions 
became prevalent during the Cold War.   Suri explained that “Cold War competition 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union continued, but in places unlikely to trigger nuclear 
armageddon.”
27
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Détente did not have the ability to change the foundational opposition that existed 
between capitalism and communism during the Cold War.  Détente was a visionary plan 
by Richard Nixon to provide practical solutions to complicated problems between nations 
with vastly different interests.  The Soviets, the Americans, and the Communist Chinese 
worked within a fragile framework of cooperation during détente, but each superpower 
still intently pursued its own Cold War objectives.  The basis for détente cooperation was 
rooted in self-interest as the three great Cold War nations negotiated based on their own 
interests.  In Henry Kissinger and the American Century (2007), Suri wrote that through 
détente the U.S. accepted “the permanence of its adversaries,” and used “its power for 
competitive leverage.”
28
  Suri points out that in the Third World the U.S. attached 
American foreign policy “to a set of brutal dictators who could wield regional force in 
ways that served U.S. international interests, often with grave human costs for their 
societies.”
29
  Suri does not comment on this, but Yahya Khan’s military regime in 
Pakistan was one of these Third World dictatorial regimes embraced by the U.S. in order 
to advance American Cold War interests. 
Nixon accepted the reality that none of the great nations could change the political 
philosophies of the other.  Détente did not require such changes to be effective.  It offered 
a means of accommodating the interests of the various Cold War powers, and also 
provided a means of defusing domestic political problems.  Suri argues that détente “had 
a social origin” and became “a convergent response to disorder among the great 
powers.”
30
  Suri shows that major cities around the world experienced student protests or 
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other significant political protests from within.  Suri argues that “a burst of violent energy 
convulsed every major society” during this period, and the Beatles’ song “Revolution” 
became a mantra among youth protestors.
31
  Suri believes that “détente was…a direct 
reaction to the “global disruption” of 1968…and “policymakers cooperated to protect 
their authority against a wide range of internal challengers.”
32
  Détente “offered 
communist leaders…that did not possess a popular base at home” a way “to bolster their 
domestic standing.”
33
  Summit meetings “made government officials look strong and 
powerful” and could be used “to condemn their internal critics for threatening 
international peace and the dignity of the state.”
34
  The baby boomers of the 1940s 
became the student protesters of the 1960s on a global scale, and Suri argued that the 
student protest movements of 1968 helped give rise to détente.   
Robert Dallek takes the argument of Third World importance to the Cold War to 
the next level.  Westad demonstrated the ideological necessity for the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union to intervene in the Third World.  Suri pointed out that the détente era accepted the 
reality that Cold War adversaries were permanent, and rather than trying to defeat them, 
Kissinger desired to use power to gain leverage and negotiate wherever possible.  Suri 
also revealed the global social unrest that contributed to the success of détente.  In Nixon 
and Kissinger: Partners in Power (2007), Dallek reveals the tensions that existed 
between Nixon and Kissinger as both men sought to become the preeminent statesman of 
their day.  Regarding the Third World, Dallek concentrates primarily on Vietnam and the 
Middle East during the Nixon presidency, but he also focuses intently on the South Asia 
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Crisis.  His treatment of the subject is brief, but it demonstrates a significant viewpoint 
among historians as to how Nixon handled the South Asia Crisis.  Dallek did not believe 
that the South Asia Crisis was a legitimate confrontation between Cold War rivals, until 
Nixon and Kissinger made it so. 
Dallek believed that Richard Nixon’s tilt toward Pakistan during the South Asia 
Crisis was a foreign policy blunder.
35
  He was convinced that Nixon and Kissinger 
overreacted by viewing the South Asia Crisis as an extension of the Cold War conflict 
rather than just a regional war between Pakistan and India.
36
  Dallek argues that because 
Nixon and Kissinger misread the situation, they began a reckless discussion of a possible 
war with the Soviet Union.
37
  The records do show that discussion did take place between 
Nixon and Kissinger regarding the possibility of War with the Soviets, but Dallek offers 
no analysis as to why the two men might have had good reason to discuss this.   
Dallek reveals that Kissinger’s fear of a Cold War confrontation in South Asia 
between the Americans, the Soviets, and the Chinese, intensified after his secret trip to 
China via Pakistan in July of 1971.  Dallek embraces the view that India’s motives for 
intervention in East Pakistan were noble and that Nixon and Kissinger overreacted.  
Pakistan’s civil war between east and west was escalating.  Dallek records that Kissinger 
returned from his visit to China with a “premonition of disaster” regarding South Asia, 
expecting India to intervene by attacking Pakistan after the summer rains.
38
  Kissinger 
“feared that China might then intervene on Pakistan’s behalf, which would move 
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Moscow “to teach Peking a lesson.””
39
  Nixon and Kissinger believed that a war limited 
to Pakistan and India would be “of limited consequence,” but feared that a broader 
conflict would “jeopardize the China initiative and provoke…dangerous tensions with 
Moscow.”
40
  Dallek understands Kissinger’s fear that war between India and Pakistan 
could cause a superpower showdown, but does not see it as a legitimate.  
When analyzing the South Asia Crisis, Dallek agrees with the assessment of 
William Bundy, a former U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs.  Bundy’s view was that “Nixon and Kissinger’s policy on the Indo-Pakistan war 
was replete with error, misjudgment, emotionalism, and unnecessary risk taking.”
41
  
Dallek believes Nixon’s highest priority during the crisis was protecting the 1972 summit 
meetings in Peking and Moscow.
42
  Losing the summit meetings would destroy the Nixon 
strategy of playing China and the Soviet Union off each other, and would be considered a 
foreign policy failure that could jeopardize a second Nixon term in office as president.
43
   
While Dallek is probably correct in his assessment of Nixon’s priorities, this 
thesis takes his argument further.  Nixon desired to protect détente during the South Asia 
Crisis, but he risked détente in its entirety in order to maintain the Cold War balance of 
power with the Soviet Union.  The Vietnam War had created an impression of American 
weakness that the Soviets sought to exploit in 1971, and Nixon was determined to shatter 
any appearance of American weakness, even if it meant losing détente and the summit 
meetings in Peking and Moscow.  Nixon understood that if the Soviets felt they were 
negotiating with a weakened America, the summit meeting in Moscow would be fruitless.  
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Nixon had to negotiate from a position of strength for détente to succeed.  His actions 
during the South Asia Crisis were meant to reinforce the image of a strong America.  
According to Dallek, during the South Asia Crisis the Soviet Union wanted to counter 
what they believed to be “a U.S. anti-Soviet offensive” in “collaboration with China and 
Pakistan.”
44
  This thesis argues that the Soviet Union not only desired to counter a 
perceived U.S. offensive in Asia due to Kissinger’s détente visit with the Chinese, but the 
Soviets desired to enable India to crush Pakistan completely.  This would enable Moscow 
to gain Soviet/Indian supremacy in South Asia should the U.S. and China prove to be 
timid.  Nixon and Kissinger held this view, and this essay argues that theirs was a valid 
and credible interpretation of events. 
Like Dallek, Dennis Kux in The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: 
Disenchanted Allies (2001), believed that Nixon and Kissinger took a simple regional 
conflict and blew it into an international Cold War confrontation.  Kux had served in the 
State Department as a South Asia Specialist, and he had dealt with India and Pakistan for 
more than two decades.
45
  Kux believed that Nixon and Kissinger were wrong in their 
assessment of India’s ambitions.  He said that “the White House’s flawed reading of 
India’s intentions toward West Pakistan almost succeeded in transforming a regional war 
into a great-power showdown.”
46
  According to Kux, “senior Pakistani officials...did not 
share the Nixon-Kissinger view that India intended to crush West Pakistan after its 
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victory in the East.”
47
  Kux explained that, “they believed that India’s ambitions were 
limited to the establishment of Bangladesh and the humiliation of Pakistan.”
48
  Kux’s 
assessment of the situation in South Asia in 1971 was based on his expertise and 
experience in the region.  His view remained the consensus of the majority during the 
crisis and in its aftermath.   
Westad and Suri explain the relation and relevance of the Third World to the 
history of the Cold War.  Dallek expands on Third World history during the Cold War by 
giving a detailed account of the Nixon and Kissinger viewpoint during the South Asia 
Crisis.  Dallek and Kux agree that Nixon and Kissinger were wrong in their assessment of 
the dangers posed by the South Asia Crisis.  Dallek and Kux believe that India did not 
plan to invade West Pakistan, and that the South Asia Crisis was purely a regional 
conflict.   Yet, the Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai, an Asian leader with a global reputation 
for his political and diplomatic insights, agreed with Nixon and Kissinger’s assessment of 
India’s intentions.
49
   
Historical works containing a Cold War synthesis seldom include the South Asia 
Crisis to any significant degree.  This would be largely based on the prevalent opinion 
that India had no ambitions beyond helping the Bengali people of East Pakistan to 
establish their independence.  If the South Asia Crisis was simply a regional conflict 
between India and Pakistan, then it would carry few Cold War implications, and would 
seldom be relevant to Cold War historians.  The actual South Asia Crisis (war between 
India and Pakistan) was also extremely short in its duration.  It lasted only from 
November 22, 1971 to December 16.  The brevity of the conflict and the belief that it was 
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only a regional war confined to South Asia accounts for its rare appearances in historical 
writings on Cold War history.  Yet, if the South Asia Crisis was actually a Cold War 
confrontation between the Soviet Union and India on one side, with China, the U.S. and 
Pakistan on the other, as Nixon and Kissinger believed, then it carried major Cold War 
significance.   
India claimed that it had no territorial ambitions as far as Pakistan was concerned 
in the aftermath of the South Asia Crisis.  Dallek and Kux take India’s claim at face value 
and criticize Nixon and Kissinger for being too paranoid.  The Indians were certainly 
concerned for the Bengali people, and they needed to stem the flow of refugees for the 
sake of India itself, but the records of Nixon and Kissinger indicate that this was not the 
primary motivation for their actions.  Nixon reasoned that with Soviet backing and the 
opinion of the international community in its favor during the crisis, India would never 
again have such an opportunity to defeat its long-standing enemy.  He believed the 
temptation for India to remove the threat of Pakistan once and for all was too great an 
opportunity for India to ignore.  Total Pakistani defeat would enable India to establish 
long-term security for itself and it would become the preeminent country in South Asia.  
Kissinger said his intelligence reports confirmed that India’s goal was to defeat all of 
Pakistan, not just the eastern wing.  Kissinger warned that India planned to move their 
forces to the West once war in the East ended, and then smash Pakistan’s land and air 
forces and annex Pakistan’s portion of a disputed land called Kashmir.
50
   
One of the significant weaknesses of détente was that in order for it to be effective 
the global balance of power had to be maintained.  If one of the Cold War nations found 
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that its power was diminished then the weakened state would have significantly less 
leverage in détente negotiations.  The United States could not allow itself to be seen as 
occupying a weaker position than the Soviet Union regarding the global balance of 
power.  To do so would imply that détente was a political necessity that Nixon had 
invented due to a weakened America.  During the Cold War the Soviet Union would be 
searching for indications of American weakness based on the debilitating consequences 
of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and would exploit any perceived weakness to its own 
advantage.  As the South Asia Crisis emerged it was crucial for Nixon to project the 
image of a powerful America, undiminished by Vietnam, if détente was to succeed. 
Pakistan in 1971 became the stage on which the Soviet Union and the U.S. would 
enter into yet another Cold War episode in the Third World which heralded global 
disaster should push come to shove.  Nixon said, “If India and the Soviet Union succeed 
in destroying Pakistan as a military and political entity,” they will be encouraged “to use 
the same tactics elsewhere.”
51
  Chinese involvement in the South Asia Crisis would be 
limited, but failure by the U.S. to confront Soviet aggression in South Asia could 
endanger all U.S. allies, particularly since the Vietnam War persisted.  Nixon was forced 
to take a tough stance in South Asia, and gambled that Soviet interests in détente would 
temporarily curb their ambitions.  Détente had caused the crisis and the crisis nearly 
ended détente, but as the crisis reached its most crucial point, Nixon confronted the 
Soviets and risked détente in order to insure the Cold War balance of power and the 
survival of Pakistan.  To the Soviet Union, the total defeat of Pakistan was considered a 
lesser priority than potential gains with the Americans through détente negotiations.  The 
Soviets agreed to use their influence to restrain Indian ambition in order to protect their 
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détente interests.  Nixon correctly assessed the Indian/Soviet alliance as a Cold War 
power play by the Soviet Union.  While India focused only on its ancient bitterness 
toward Pakistan during the war, the Soviet Union sought to humiliate the U.S. and China 
on a global scale should they fail to assist Pakistan as it faced complete destruction as a 
sovereign nation.  Once the South Asia Crisis concluded, the United States rapidly moved 






























DÉTENTE CAUSES THE SOUTH ASIA CRISIS 
 
Nixon’s Failure to Adequately Address Atrocities by Pakistan 
During Its Civil War Resulted in Intervention by India 
It was Richard Nixon’s desire to begin détente and build diplomatic relations with 
China that turned U.S. focus toward Pakistan.  Nixon needed an intermediary to facilitate 
an opening to China.  Pakistan held an alliance with China that had been in place for 
nearly a decade.  This alliance had angered the administration of President Lyndon B. 
Johnson, but provided a golden opportunity for Nixon to build his bridge to China as the 
first step in détente.  President Yahya Khan of Pakistan had relationships with the major 
leaders of both the United States and China and could provide Nixon with the channel he 
needed.  Yahya was recruited by Nixon to fill this role after the U.S. President had 
determined he was the best option.  It was for this reason Nixon opened a new episode in 
U.S. Pakistani relations during his first term in office.   
As détente began, a catastrophic cyclone hit East Pakistan and caused a political 
crisis which in turn triggered a civil war.  Pakistan’s conflict over the secession of East 
Pakistan escalated into civil war due to Yahya’s brutality against his own people as he 
tried to suppress a political rebellion using violence.  To establish détente in this early 
stage Nixon carefully avoided any action that could jeopardize his relationship with 
24 
 
Yahya Khan.  Nixon needed to remain on good terms with Yahya in spite of a U.S. 
Congress that was firmly opposed to Yahya’s actions.  The Pakistani President turned 
international opinion against himself as his brutality became atrocity which sent a flood 
of refugees into India.  Nixon believed his public silence was necessary regarding the 
internal affairs of Pakistan in order to protect détente, even as the wrath of the 
international community descended upon the Yahya Khan.  
America’s silence over Yahya’s actions implied collusion that sparked 
international outrage.  Nixon’s own diplomats in East Pakistan, unaware of Nixon’s 
détente strategies, turned against him.  Nixon desired to protect his detente initiative by 
maintaining a neutral position, but the U.S. Congress and the U.S. news media favored 
India.  Nixon also could see the potential for a repeat of Vietnam in South Asia, which 
reinforced his belief in neutrality.  Kissinger said that if the U.S. “were to support the 
insurgents in East Pakistan” it would turn West Pakistan against the United States.
52
  
Nixon agreed and said, “If we get in the middle of that thing it would be a hell of a 
mistake.”
53
  Nixon’s policy was that Pakistan could handle its own affairs without the 
assistance of the international community.  He did nothing of consequence to prevent the 
brutality of Yahya Khan against his own people for two reasons: first he wanted to 
protect détente, and second, he did not want another Vietnam. 
The refugee situation became an unmanageable situation for India, and Indira 
Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India, decided to covertly oppose the military forces of 
Yahya Khan.  When détente caused the Nixon White House to avoid its moral obligations 
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to the brutalized Bengali people of East Pakistan, India began to mobilize in support of 
the East Pakistani resistance.  India aided the Bengali guerilla fighters politically and 
militarily.  Gandhi also harbored Bengali diplomats, and prevented the return of refugees 
to Pakistan to keep them out of harm’s way.  Gandhi then wrote to ask Nixon to use 
American influence in order to pressure Yahya Khan to rein in his rampaging military, 
but Nixon felt he could not do this.  Nixon needed the help of Yahya Khan to begin 
detente, and that took precedence.  Nixon’s apparent indifference to Gandhi’s requests 
encouraged India to intervene.  Détente had caused Nixon’s silence, and Nixon’s silence 
would trigger war between India and Pakistan.   
This chapter will reveal that détente was responsible for the South Asia Crisis of 
1971.  Détente aggravated U.S. relations with India in two distinct ways that would lead 
to war between Pakistan and India.  First, Nixon’s secrecy on détente and his silence on 
Yahya’s atrocities led to India’s increased determination to intervene on behalf of the 
Bengali militia, and brought intense criticism by his own U.S. diplomats.  Second, Nixon 
hardened Indian resolve to intervene on behalf of the Bengali resistance using its own 
military forces when he failed to respond adequately to Gandhi’s appeal.  Nixon’s public 
silence regarding Yahya’s atrocities implied U.S. collusion with Pakistan, which 
prompted Indian collusion with the Bengali resistance.  Détente motivated Nixon’s 
actions, which motivated India’s responses, and caused the South Asia Crisis. 
The U.S. did not understand the depth of the historical conflict between Pakistan 
and India due to the episodic nature of American relations with Pakistan.  The U.S. was 
preoccupied by its view of communism as the great global threat, and never completely 
understood that Pakistan feared India much more than it feared communism.  The U.S. 
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maintained a “get in and get out” policy in Pakistan during the Cold War.  When Pakistan 
played a role in American Cold War objectives, the U.S. became involved in Pakistan, 
and then withdrew when those objectives were accomplished.  The lack of understanding 
regarding Pakistan’s historical bitterness toward India was caused by these Cold War 
episodes.  During the early years of the Nixon administration, Pakistan was viewed as a 
potential ally against communist aggression.  There was no serious recognition by the 
U.S. that most Pakistani people considered the real security threat to be India.
54
  Failure 
by the U.S. to develop a genuine desire to understand the region, and to assist Pakistan 
politically in an ongoing manner, led to a shallow diplomatic understanding of the region.  
Nixon would be blindsided by a war between Pakistan and India in 1971 that erupted 
quickly and defied all diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution.   
One cannot grasp the full scope of Pakistan’s political history without taking into 
account the historical animosity between Pakistan and India.  Pakistan and modern India 
came into existence simultaneously in 1947 when the British gave governmental 
authority back to the native people of South Asia.  In its formative years “Pakistan was an 
idea, not a state.  The original idea of a Pakistani state revolved around creating a 
homeland for Indian Muslims where they would not be dominated by the Indian Hindu 
majority.”
55
  In reality, Pakistanis are Indian Muslims still focused on their ancient 
conflict with Indian Hindus.  This deep-rooted connection to India is the basis for an 
understanding of Pakistan.  Even the members of the lowest classes in Indian Hindu 
culture “believed themselves part of a system superior to Muslims.”
56
  Such attitudes 
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provoked resentment among the Muslims of Pakistan where India was concerned.
57
  The 
British evacuation of India left a power vacuum in the country, and violence between 
Pakistan’s Muslims and India’s Hindus developed immediately because there was no 
longer a colonial adversary to unite them.  This ongoing conflict caused President 
Johnson to say “that what we did for many countries was repaid by their involving us in 
their own ancient feuds.”
58
   
The dispute over Kashmir has been a source of constant friction between India 
and Pakistan as both have laid claim to possession.  Kashmir is among the most desirable 
of all lands in South Asia.  The agreeable climate provides relief from the brutal summer 
temperatures of the plains of northern India.
59
  The Vale of Kashmir provides a 
comfortable and prosperous location, along with its lakes, and the Himalayan Mountains 
as a picturesque backdrop.
60
  In 1947, Kashmir contained an 80% Muslim majority, but 
was ruled by a Hindu maharajah.
61
  The ruler of Kashmir did not align himself with either 
Pakistan or India during the time of their partition by the British,
62
 and even while he 
lived, there was turmoil inside Kashmir related to alignment with India or Pakistan.  
Arbitration within the United Nations took place in 1948, but its resolutions satisfied 
neither India nor Pakistan.  The region of Kashmir has been an unresolved source of 
tension and conflict between the two countries ever since.   
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Pakistan has a history of military rule since its origin in 1947.  Civilian 
governments in Pakistan have regularly experienced conflict during multi-party 
democratic political campaigns.  The depth of this conflict threatened the fragile security 
of the country, and greatly worried military leaders.  Commanding generals of the 
Pakistan military would regularly seize power and declare martial law, and then establish 
social order as they saw fit.  This has happened four times in Pakistan’s modern history 
under Ayub Khan (1958), Yahya Khan (1969)
63
, Zia-ul-Haq (1977), and Pervez 
Musharraf (1999).  These coups were often related to Pakistan’s fear of India, but were 
just as often a mere pretext by the military to seize the reins of power.  Experience had 
taught Pakistan’s generals that civilian rule was too deeply divided and lacked the 
precision and unity of a military structure.  When internal strife caused by partisan 
elections weakened the government, a military leader would seize power for himself in 
the name of national security.  The generals assured the people that civilian rule would 
soon be reestablished once national security was assured, but such promises often proved 
hollow.    
Pakistan’s desire for U.S. armaments has been a central theme of U.S.-Pakistan 
relations from the very beginning.  Pakistan became a member of the Baghdad Pact of 
1955 which later became known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).
64
  This 
evolved into a bilateral agreement of cooperation between the U.S., Turkey, Iran, and 
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  CENTO and its companion organization SEATO (Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization) guaranteed member nations the right to have access to U.S. 
armaments in order to defend against communist encroachment by the Soviet Union or 
China.  Pakistan’s alliance with the U.S. had little to do with stopping the advance of 
communism.  When the U.S. offered weapons in exchange for Pakistan joining an 
alliance to combat communism, Pakistan agreed because it wanted a stockpile of U.S. 
weapons to insure its own security against India.  It was most likely for this reason that 
Pakistan agreed to join U.S. anti-communist alliances like CENTO and SEATO during 
the Cold War.  Membership meant that Pakistan became eligible for U.S. military aid.
66
  
Kissinger said this aid “was intended for use against Communist aggression, but was 
suspected by India of having other more likely uses.”
67
   
American involvement in Pakistan followed the episodic nature of U.S. Cold War 
strategy around the globe.  The U.S. became interested in Pakistan when it leased a U.S. 
Air Force Base in Peshawar in July, 1959.
68
 The base was used for Cold War surveillance 
operations.
69
  This motivated U.S. development projects including loans and grants for 
irrigation, seaports, water and sewage, education, highways, railways, banks, food 
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storage, and commercial road vehicle projects.
70
  These investments in Pakistan’s future 
were designed to produce healthy economic growth and to provide the needed capital for 
individual business initiative.
71
  The investments were the result of American interest in 
Peshawar.  When the base closed in July 1969
72
 after Pakistan terminated the lease, U.S. 
interest in Pakistan faded.  There existed no abiding loyalty or commitment toward 
Pakistan as far as the U.S. was concerned once a Cold War episode concluded.  American 
governmental programs and expenditures often ended suddenly.  This pattern of 
American activity is clearly evident in U.S. relations with Pakistan.   
The 1962 border war between China and India was a Cold War episode that 
resulted in the U.S. supplying armaments to India to stop communist advance by the 
Chinese.  Pakistan protested this action, but Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. 
Johnson decided India was going to get what it needed militarily regardless of Pakistani 
protests.  American global Cold War objectives took priority over Pakistan’s regional 
objectives.  In the 1960s, verbal assurances to Pakistan of American protection in times 
of conflict increasingly substituted for military hardware.
73
  The U.S. assured Pakistani 
President Ayub Khan that it would check Indian aggression against Pakistan through the 
use of an American aircraft carrier task force on standby in the Indian Ocean.  In 1962, 
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U.S./Pakistani relations suffered greatly because the U.S. assisted India militarily against 
Chinese encroachment.  American military aid to India in 1962 began the Pakistani 
relationship with China.  Ayub reached out to China for military aid to supplement 
Pakistan’s forces against India because the U.S. provided India with military equipment 
based on American Cold War objectives. 
India and Pakistan went to war in September 1965, with both countries using U.S. 
arms in the conflict.  President Johnson “halted all arms shipments” to both countries.
74
  
The arms embargo remained in effect for the remainder of the 1960s, and into the Nixon 
era.  In February 1966, the U.S. relaxed the ban to permit purchases of “non-lethal” 
equipment.”
75
  America was protecting its economic investments in Pakistan by 
providing limited military aid.  The U.S. worried that Pakistan would divert money from 
economic development and invest it in new military equipment at significantly higher 
prices.
76
  When Nixon came to the White House in 1969, Pakistan was still scrambling 
for military aid which the U.S. was hesitant to provide.  India had superior military 
capabilities compared to Pakistan.
77
  Much of Pakistan’s military equipment was growing 
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obsolete by 1971 and they did not have the industrial capacity to manufacture their own 
equipment as India did.
78
   
79 
East and West Pakistan in 1970 showing the disputed region of Kashmir with India located in between the 
eastern and western wings of Pakistan.   Pakistan in 1970 consisted of these two wings, each separated 
from the other by roughly 1,000 miles of hostile Indian territory.  Pakistan had a difficult job governing the 
two wings because the eastern part of Pakistan (modern Bangladesh) was ruled from West Pakistan. 
 
In order to prevent further military entanglements in foreign wars such as 
Vietnam, Nixon formulated a policy for Asia known as the Nixon Doctrine during his 
first year in office.  It was established in order to align U.S. foreign policy with 
America’s goal to withdraw from Vietnam.  In July,
 
1969, President Nixon met with 
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reporters in Guam after he had witnessed the splashdown of the Apollo astronauts 
following their return from the first landing on the moon.  Perhaps due to the elation of an 
American moon landing in the heart of the Cold War, Nixon spontaneously outlined a 
doctrine that would define U.S. policy in Asia and reassure American allies.  The Nixon 
Doctrine was built on three primary points.  The first was that the United States would 
keep all its treaty commitments.
80
  The second point promised that the U.S. would 
provide a shield if a nuclear power threatened the freedom of a nation allied with 
America or of a nation whose survival the U.S. considered vital to U.S. security and that 
of the region as a whole.
81
  Third, in cases involving other types of aggression the U.S. 
promised to furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate.  
Yet, the U.S. would “look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary 
responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.”
82
  Vietnam had altered 
American foreign policy in that it would no longer intervene militarily unless the 
communist superpowers (Russia or China) attacked a U.S. ally directly.
83
  Nixon said, 
“As far as our role is concerned, we must avoid the kind of policy that will make 
countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one 
we have in Vietnam.”
84
  The Nixon Doctrine was designed to limit American 
involvement in Asia, and it required Third World nations to take responsibility for the 
manpower necessary for their own defense.  In a summary prepared for the National 
Security Council Staff in August 1971, as Nixon’s administration considered what to do 
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in the event of hostilities between Pakistan and India, the phrase “short of providing U.S. 
combat personnel”
85
 appears twice.  This clearly suggested that the U.S. had no intention 
of sending troops into another Asian conflict.   
Détente flowed out of the Nixon Doctrine by necessity.  The U.S. needed a 
legitimate means of negotiation in place to limit its Third World conflicts and avoid 
superpower entanglements.  Diplomatic negotiation from a neutral position to defuse 
hostilities was the primary U.S. objective.  When Nixon initiated détente, one of his goals 
was to end the Vietnam War, but by 1971 Nixon seemed to be looking past the Vietnam 
War to larger Cold War opportunities that were presented through détente.  Reelection 
meant historic breakthroughs on nuclear armaments between the Soviets and the U.S. that 
promised to assure Nixon a place in history.  The Nixon Doctrine laid the diplomatic 
foundation for détente by establishing that the U.S. desired to negotiate with other great 
powers.   
As Nixon came to office, political unrest was emerging in Pakistan.  Pakistani 
President Ayub Khan had resigned his office in March, 1969, and declared martial law in 
Pakistan.  He said that he did not want to preside over the destruction of his country.
86
  
Ayub appointed General Yahya Khan as martial law administrator to reestablish order.  
East Pakistan had been the stage for regular problems related to famine and poverty.  In 
October 1969, Yayha appealed to President Nixon for one million tons of wheat on an 
emergency basis to stem the tide of a deteriorating food and price situation in East 
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  Yahya had already shipped a quarter-million tons of wheat and 350,000 tons 
of rice from West to East Pakistan, but even that was insufficient.
88
  The problems of 
geographical separation and chronic hunger challenges posed great difficulty for Yahya 
Khan as he attempted to govern East Pakistan. 
As part of Nixon’s détente strategy to remain in the good graces of Yahya Khan, 
Nixon secured a one-time exception to the arms embargo imposed against Pakistan by the 
U.S. Congress.  In July of 1970 the Nixon administration notified Agha Hilaly, the 
Ambassador from Pakistan, that it had approved a military arms sale to Pakistan.  
Included in this sale were twelve tactical fighter aircraft (F-104Gs or F-5s), 300 armored 
personnel carriers, four advanced design naval patrol anti-submarine aircraft, and seven 
B-57 bombers (to replace those lost through attrition).
89
  When the ambassador asked 
why no tanks were included in the sale, Kissinger replied that tanks could create a furor 
in Congress that could “wreck the whole arrangement.”
90
   Pakistan wanted tanks from 
the U.S., but this would increase the difficulty of selling the bill to Congress.
91
  Nixon 
and Kissinger instead sought to have tanks transferred from Turkey to Pakistan.
92
  Nixon 
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and Kissinger desired to provide military equipment to Pakistan because Yahya Khan 
was a military leader rather than a civilian leader and his political support base was 
military.  For Yahya to secure his government, he had to present himself to the military as 
a leader capable of acquiring the military equipment his country needed.   
Nixon’s military aid package to Yahya Khan would secure their friendship and 
strengthen Yahya’s hand with his political support base in Pakistan.  Nixon’s military aid 
package for Pakistan during a time of U.S. military embargo placed Nixon’s relationship 
with Yahya on very solid ground.  Nixon took full credit for the one-time exception so 
that Yahya would know he had a personal debt to the American president.
93
  In October 
of 1970, the same month that the military aid sale to Pakistan was approved, Nixon said 
to Yahya, “It is essential that we open negotiations with China.”
94
  Yahya Khan was 
happy to be of assistance as the mediator between Washington and Peking based on 
America’s renewed interest in supplying military aid to Pakistan.  Nixon’s military aid 
package for Yahya Khan was designed to produce precisely his kind of enthusiasm from 
the Pakistani President. 
The exception to the U.S. military embargo against Pakistan was done by Nixon 
for the sake of détente.  Nixon’s arms package to Yahya Khan during a time of U.S. 
embargo caused strain in U.S. relations with India even before the civil war began.  This 
would make peace negotiations significantly more difficult during the South Asia Crisis 
that was soon to follow.  Nixon’s military aid package to Pakistan prior to the outbreak of 
Pakistan’s civil war shows that détente-related actions by the Nixon White House 
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contributed to the South Asia Crisis.  India could see only that the U.S. and Pakistan were 
in collusion, but it did not understand why.  India expected the worst.  Nixon’s military 
support for Pakistan grieved India and the U.S. ambassador to India, Kenneth Keating, 
found it difficult to explain.
95
  The favoritism that the Nixon administration was showing 
to Pakistan in order to secure détente was misunderstood by India.  India had no 
knowledge of Nixon’s desire to visit Peking using Yahya Khan to mediate.  India 
measured U.S. military sales to Pakistan as a threat to Indian security and it brought a 
cooling in U.S./Indian relations.  The deal caused tension between India and the United 
States by causing suspicion as to U.S. intentions.   
A month after Nixon’s military aid package for Pakistan was secured, a natural 
disaster hit the Bengali people of East Pakistan that made all previous hardships appear 
minimal.  A massive cyclone struck the region on November 12-13, 1970.  The New York 
Times reported on November 16 that the cyclone and subsequent tidal wave may have 
killed 200,000 people.
96
   More than one million people were said to be homeless, and 
one-half million people needed relief.
97
  The New York Times added that 235,000 houses 
had been destroyed and another 100,000 damaged; some 250,000 tons of rice crops had 
been destroyed, followed by an outbreak of cholera and typhoid.
98
  On November 22, the 
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Times modified its reports to say that the “cyclone may be the worst catastrophe of the 
century,” with news that 500,000 persons may have perished.
99
   
The cyclone disaster quickly evolved into a political crisis for the military regime 
of Yahya Khan.  Yahya had scheduled national elections for October 1970, but due to the 
cyclone these elections were delayed until December.  This turned out to be a tragic 
political misstep for Yahya Khan.  The national elections became a platform to criticize 
Yahya’s incompetence during the cyclone crisis.
100
  He was depicted as slow in his 
response and negligent when it came to the suffering of the people in East Pakistan.  The 
elections yielded a dramatic victory in the East for Mujibur Rahman and his political 
organization known as the Awami League.  Mujib Rahman and the Awami League put 
forth a six-point program calling for “full provincial autonomy for East Pakistan.”  
Rahman declared that East Pakistan “would have its own currency, keep its own separate 
account for foreign exchange, raise its own taxes, set its own fiscal policy, and maintain 
its own militia...”
101
  East and West Pakistan would be held together only by mutual 
responsibilities to defense and foreign policy.
102
   
President Yahya Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of the Pakistan People’s Party, 
who had won significant votes in the West during the election, rejected Mujib’s demands 
for East Pakistan saying they were “tantamount to secession.”
103
  As each side stiffened 
their resolve, “a stalemate, or crisis, was imminent.”
104
  In March 1971, Mujib Rahman 
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announced the takeover of the administration of East Pakistan.
105
  This action directly 
confronted Yahya’s government while carefully avoiding a declaration of 
independence.
106
  Yahya then flew to Dacca in East Pakistan to talk directly with Mujib 
himself.  When this achieved no results, Yahya had Mujib arrested for treason and 
brought him back to West Pakistan to be imprisoned.   
Yahya Khan was a military autocrat who would not tolerate the idea of political 
autonomy in East Pakistan and the likely dismemberment of his country.  He stubbornly 
believed that he could intimidate East Pakistan’s people into submission using a force of 
30,000-40,000 troops in the East violently brutalizing the population.  Yahya’s brutality 
in East Pakistan began in late March of 1971.  Soon after, Yahya sent a letter to President 
Nixon explaining that “the situation in East Pakistan is well under control and normal life 
is being restored.”
107
  Yahya assured Nixon that he could handle the problems in East 
Pakistan, but reminded the American President of India’s interference in the internal 
affairs of Pakistan.  He told Nixon that India had moved its military closer to the East 
Pakistan border, and assured Nixon that negative reports from “outside sources” were 
inaccurate, “especially the news media,” and were “designed to mislead world public 
opinion.”
108
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Nixon and Kissinger took some comfort in this report,
109
 until their own 
diplomats began to speak out against them.  On April 6, the U.S. Consul General in 
Dacca, East Pakistan, Archer K. Blood, sent a statement of dissent signed by roughly 
twenty of his colleagues to the U.S. Department of State.  They expressed anger at the 
U.S. government’s failure to denounce the suppression of democracy in East Pakistan, 
and to denounce Yahya’s atrocities.  Blood alleged that the U.S. failed to adequately to 
protect its citizens and was “bending over backwards to placate the West Pakistan 
dominated government and to lessen…negative international public relations impact 
against them.”
110
  In this telegram, Blood accused the U.S. government of “moral 
bankruptcy.”
111
  U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Kissinger were furious 
that the State Department in East Pakistan had made public statements against the Nixon 
White House.  They believed that Blood’s letter would eventually reach Senator Edward 
M. Kennedy, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees, and the Democratic 
Congress, which would embarrass the Nixon administration.
112
  Nixon transferred Archer 
Blood as a result of the cable.  Yet, Kissinger saw validity in Blood’s charges because 
“the United States could not condone a brutal military repression” and “the strong-arm 
tactics of the Pakistani military” under Yahya Khan.
113
  Kissinger explained that “the 
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administration’s decision not to react publicly to the military repression in East Pakistan” 
was “necessary to protect “our sole channel to China.””
114
  Nixon wanted to protect 
détente by remaining silent.  His failure to chastise Yahya for his actions confused many, 
and outraged some.   
One of the components in Nixon’s détente strategy was secrecy.  There were very 
few people aware that Nixon wanted to start diplomatic relations with the Chinese while 
arms limitation talks were under way with the Soviets.  Nixon pursued a larger Cold War 
strategy than simply attempting to negotiate with the Soviets on nuclear armaments.  
Nixon desired to be the key player in a global effort to bring all the Cold War 
superpowers to the negotiating table.  If successful, Nixon knew détente could also 
provide the means to extricate the U.S. from the Vietnam War as well as provide his best 
hope for reelection in 1972.  The secrecy of the Nixon White House over détente caused 
him to be misunderstood by many regarding his foreign policy moves in Pakistan.  He 
came under severe criticism for not using his influence to curb Yahya’s actions.  As 
Nixon prepared to initiate détente and utilize Pakistan as the intermediary to China, he 
needed to guarantee the loyalty of Yahya Khan as his channel to China.  Nixon realized 
that any public statement he made against Yahya’s treatment of the Bengali people could 
alienate him from the Pakistani President and jeopardize détente.  In order to assure the 
loyalty of the Pakistani President Nixon did not speak out at any point against Yahya’s 
atrocities. 
The U.S. believed an independent Bangladesh would come into existence as the 
natural result of Pakistan’s political evolution regardless of Yahya’s efforts to prevent it.  
Nixon and Kissinger saw no point getting involved in an internal Pakistani civil war in 





which both the United States and China believed the outcome was already assured.  The 
American Ambassador to Pakistan, Joseph S. Farland, explained in an April telegram that 
the Awami League had mounted a resistance movement against Yahya’s forces.  He said, 
“events of the past two weeks have left such severe emotional scars that it (is) hard to 
conceive that anything West Pakistan can now do will make most Bengalis willing 
citizens of Pakistan.  Bengali grievances (were) now etched in blood.”
115
  Farland was 
convinced that Yahya might be able to crush his political opposition temporarily, but not 
permanently.
116
   
The effects of the cyclone and the ensuing civil war were so far-reaching that the 
musician George Harrison, of Beatles fame, organized a concert in Madison Square 
Garden called the Concert for Bangladesh.  It was the first benefit concert of its kind, and 
it “became the model for large scale, big name benefits that are common today.”
117
  
When approached in 1971 by his friend, Indian musician Ravi Shankar, for help for flood 
and war ravaged Bangladesh; Harrison decided he wanted to help.
118
  Harrison pulled 
together an all-star lineup including the famous musicians Eric Clapton, Bob Dylan, Leon 
Russell, and Billy Preston.  On August first, the concert was held; it was recorded and 
filmed and later released in movie theaters.
119
  Shankar later told Rolling Stone magazine, 
“Within hours of the show, Bangladesh was known all over the world.”
120
  This global 
exposure of events in Bangladesh brought Nixon’s policies in South Asia under even 
                                                          
115
 “Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State,” Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1969-1976 Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 22, 




 “Concert For Bangladesh,” DVD Review – 










more scrutiny.  Nixon had originally earmarked $2.5 million
121
 for refugee relief to 
cyclone-ravaged East Pakistan.  As the death toll mounted and the civil war began to 
emerge, the U.S. committed $250 million in relief funds.
122
  Even this significant amount 
of U.S. aid only touched the surface of the needs in East Pakistan. 
The unforeseen consequence of Nixon’s silence was the Indian reaction.  India 
interpreted Nixon’s silence as agreement with Yahya’s policies on East Pakistan.  This 
encouraged India to step in and take a leadership role on behalf of the Bengali people.  
One month after the Pakistan civil war began; India gave direct assistance to the Bengali 
militia of East Pakistan.  In April 1971, Henry Kissinger learned of a request by India to 
provide unmarked small arms for the East Pakistani “freedom fighters” through 
American CIA channels.
123
  Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman believed that he had 
a secure channel for delivery, but did not think the operation would remain secret for 
long.
124
  Assistant Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco felt that the Indians were testing the 
United States, and he noted: “It is one thing for the U.S. to close its eyes to reports of 
clandestine Indian support for the East Pakistani resistance movement, but quite another 
thing for the U.S. to collude with the Indians in this supply.”
125
  Kissinger said, “He felt 
the President would never approve this project.”
126
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Nixon’s strategy of protecting détente by refusing to criticize Pakistan led to an 
escalation of the conflict between Pakistan and India.  Nixon’s unwillingness to publicly 
denounce Yahya’s military created an impression within India that the United States 
colluded with Pakistan in the oppression of the Bengali people.  Nixon’s apathy 
encouraged India to support East Pakistan both militarily and politically.  Pakistan’s 
Ambassador to the United States, Agha Hilaly, told the U.S. Department of State in 
April, 1971, that representatives of the “Provisional Government of Bangla Desh” might 
approach them.
127
  Hilaly said that India had permitted the establishment of a Bangla 
Desh government on its territory, and was providing financial support.
128
  Hilaly added 
that Bengali representatives had no right to speak on behalf of Pakistan and had been 
charged with treason.
129
  Pakistan was outraged that India interfered in what was an 
internal affair within the borders of a sovereign country, but India could only see that 
someone needed to stand up to Yahya for the sake of the Bengali refugees.  Nixon has 
chosen not to do this, so Gandhi believed that it was her responsibility to do so.   
Nixon’s public silence on Yahya’s actions led to Indian support of East Pakistan’s 
political and military goals.  Once Gandhi had established this precedent, she appealed 
directly to Nixon to use his influence with Pakistan to help prevent the endless flow of 
Bengali refugees into India.  Gandhi sent a letter to President Nixon on May 13, saying 
that some three million refugees had fled East Pakistan to India; a number that grew at 
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the rate of about 50,000 per day.
130
  The care of these refugees was “imposing an 
enormous burden” on her country, said Gandhi, and “the regions which the refugees are 
entering are over-crowded and politically the most sensitive.”
131
  She feared that these 
areas could “very easily become explosive,” thereby constituting a “security risk” to 
India “which no responsible government can allow to develop.”
132
  Gandhi asked Nixon 
to “impress upon the rulers of Pakistan that they owe a duty towards their own citizens 
whom they have treated so callously.”
133
  She hoped “that the power and prestige of the 
United States will be used to persuade the military rulers of Pakistan to recognize that the 
solution they have chosen for their problem in East Pakistan is unwise and untenable.”
134
  
Gandhi explained that Yahya’s claims of restoring normalcy to East Pakistan could not 
be taken seriously until Pakistan “is able to stop this daily flow of its citizens across the 
border.”
135
   
Gandhi’s letter was meant to suggest to Nixon that he needed to intervene by 
restraining Yahya Khan, or India would take the fighting in East Pakistan to the next 
level.  The refugees were posing a political danger to India, and she meant that India 
would be forced to act if Nixon did not use America’s influence to curb Yahya’s actions.  
Her letter was an appeal to reason which also carried the veiled threat of war with 
Pakistan.  Two weeks later, in a slow response to Gandhi’s letter, Nixon replied that the 
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U.S. was significantly involved in relief efforts for the Bengali refugees.
136
  He explained 
that “in regard to the basic cause of the human suffering and dislocation…we have 
chosen to work primarily through quiet diplomacy.”
137
  Nixon expressed concern for the 
Bengali people, and assured Gandhi of his work behind the scenes to achieve peace, and 
to create conditions where the refugees could “return to their homes.”
138
  Yet, he would 
not say anything against Yahya’s actions publicly.  The result was that Yahya’s military 
never showed restraint, which proved that Nixon’s quiet diplomacy efforts were entirely 
ineffective.  Quiet diplomacy instead of direct confrontation toward Pakistan was a 
strategy designed to protect détente.  Nixon’s inadequate response to Gandhi’s letter 
further encouraged India to intervene on behalf of the Bengali people, and led to war in 
South Asia.  
Nixon’s loyalty to Yahya Khan for the sake of détente would alienate India.  
Indira Gandhi eventually reached a point where she no longer tried to negotiate with the 
American President, but took matters into her own hands.  India expected nothing from 
China as far as restraining Pakistan because both China and Pakistan were considered 
enemies of India.  Yet, America was on friendly terms with India, and Gandhi expected 
Nixon and Kissinger to use their influence to help curb the brutality of Yahya’s military.  
When this did not happen, Gandhi actively supported the Bengali resistance.  Even 
though the Nixon White House had provided significant humanitarian aid to help with 
displaced refugees, India would stiffen its resolve against the United States once Nixon 
and Kissinger began to negotiate for peace.  The indifference Nixon had communicated 
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to Gandhi when she asked the American president to use his influence to restrain Yahya 
Khan would be returned to Nixon when he asked the Indian Prime Minister to restrain her 
own military.  Both requests would be ignored. 
Nixon had groomed Yahya to become his channel to China before and during the 
Pakistan civil war.  Nixon had developed a good deal of political influence with Yahya 
Khan, but he did not use it to curb Yahya’s atrocities against his own people.  Instead, 
Nixon reserved his political capital with the Pakistani President solely for purposes 
related to détente.  The secret trip to China by Henry Kissinger in the summer of 1971 
gave Yahya a sense of participation in a game of international intrigue that he greatly 
enjoyed.  Kissinger said to Chinese Premier, Chou En-Lai, that Yahya was “not very 
intelligent” and “not a very good general,” but he was “a decent man” who was thrilled to 
be part of Kissinger’s secret trip to China because “he loved secret missions” and he “was 
beside himself with conspiratorial maneuvers.”
139
  Kissinger also said that Yahya’s 
advice on how to deal with the Chinese Prime Minister turned out to be wrong, which 
caused Chou En-lai to laugh when he heard of it.
140
  Yahya may not have been the ideal 
channel to China, but he represented a nation that had built strong diplomatic ties with the 
Chinese for nearly a decade, while maintaining good relations with the United States as 
well.  He was the best channel to China as Nixon began détente because both the U.S. 
and China trusted him.   
Yahya Khan had always believed he would remain in power in one form or 
another as the civilian governmental factions of Pakistan fought with each other.  He saw 
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his military role as a sort of paternal watchman.  He would allow the civilian 
governments to do their best, but Yahya was confident it would inevitably become his job 
to restore order should chaos envelope the country due to political battles between rival 
parties.  Kissinger observed that Yahya was confident he would “remain the arbiter of 
Pakistan’s politics”
141
 regardless of the elections of civilian leaders, but the South Asia 
Crisis would threaten Yahya Khan’s hold on power.  Yahya’s attempts to stop the East 
Pakistani insurrection using brute force would cause atrocities that outraged the world, 
and East Pakistan’s refugees would become a continuous and ever-increasing flow into 
India’s major urban areas.
142
  Nixon’s partnership with Yahya Khan regarding détente 
was kept secret from the public, resulting in a negative interpretation of his actions where 
the Bengali refugees were concerned.  The Nixon White House was considered to be 
calloused and indifferent.  The U.S. Congress, Nixon’s own diplomats, and Indira Gandhi 
were unaware of Nixon’s détente goals with China at the time.  The American news 
media, Congress, and the international community supported India who had borne the 
burden of caring for the refugees that fled before Pakistan’s military.  Yahya found his 
military isolated in the east and the threat of war with India hanging over his head. 
Nixon’s efforts to protect détente by taking no public action against Yahya’s 
atrocities motivated India to a greater determination to intervene on behalf of the Bengali 
people.  What appeared to Gandhi as U.S. indifference toward the Bengali people caused 
her to close her mind to peace negotiations.  India would use the refugee problem as the 
reason why it needed to intervene in Pakistan’s civil war, and few would deny that Indian 
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intervention was a just cause.  Nixon’s détente actions prior to and during the Pakistan 
civil war increased anxiety among Indian leaders and hardened their resolve against 
Pakistan.  The Nixon administration had scheduled a secret trip to China by Henry 
Kissinger on July 9-11, and Nixon refused to jeopardize his detente initiative by making 
public statements against the actions of Yahya Khan’s military even when those actions 
were egregious and brutal.  This left India to become the defender of an oppressed and 
abused Bengali people, and the support of the international community rested with India.   
The cyclone in East Pakistan would be the primary cause of Pakistan’s civil war, 
but the South Asia Crisis was caused by détente.  The civil war was an internal affair 
within the borders of a sovereign country, and Yahya Khan wanted it to stay that way.  
The atrocities perpetrated by Yahya’s military upon his own people in East Pakistan, 
combined with Nixon’s refusal to intervene or speak publicly against Yahya’s actions, 
provoked India to intervene.   Indian intervention defined the South Asia Crisis.  With 
world opinion behind it, India aided East Pakistani guerilla forces, and sought to establish 
an independent government of Bangladesh to enable the Bengali people to escape the 
brutality of Pakistan’s military.  An aggressive and determined group of East Pakistani 
guerilla fighters became known as the Mukti Bahini.  India trained and equipped these 
Bengali freedom fighters and then sent them back into East Pakistan to battle Yahya’s 
forces and fight to obtain their independence.
143
  The breakdown in U.S./India relations 
precipitated by Nixon’s détente objectives, encouraged Indira Gandhi to become 
aggressively involved in the defense of the Bengali people.  In so doing she launched the 
potential for superpower hostilities based on U.S./Chinese alliances with Pakistan, and a 
Soviet alliance with India.  The South Asia Crisis was war between Pakistan and India 
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combined with a Cold War confrontation between the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union 






























DÉTENTE THREATENED DURING THE SOUTH ASIA CRISIS 
 
War between Pakistan and India Threatens to Become a  
Cold War Confrontation between the Great Powers  
that could End Détente 
 
The South Asia Crisis had its roots in détente, and the South Asia Crisis 
threatened to destroy détente.  As Richard Nixon approached the diplomatic breakthrough 
with China that defined his presidency, the South Asia Crisis was about to explode.  
Nixon’s ability to restore diplomatic relations with China would be remembered as a 
profound foreign relations triumph that established détente between the superpowers.  
Yet, as Nixon’s historic foreign policies were beginning to blossom the U.S. Congress 
took action against Pakistan that threatened to thwart Nixon’s partnership with Pakistan’s 
President Yahya Khan.  The U.S. Ambassador to India sided with India in the crisis, and 
Indira Gandhi of India ignored peace initiatives by Nixon and Kissinger.  Gandhi used 
the Pakistani refugees as a tool to leverage her political goals by insisting that Yahya 
Khan grant the Bengali people independence before she released the refugees to return to 
East Pakistan.  As Indira Gandhi asked her generals to design an Israeli-type lightening 
strike into East Pakistan, Nixon found his détente initiative further complicated by 
Yahya’s impulsiveness.  Yahya made plans to have Mujibur Rahman tried for treason, a 
politically inept move that could only complicate the crisis.  When Yahya’s West 
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Pakistan forces and East Pakistan’s militia (Mukti Bahini) went to war, Hindus were 
targeted by the Muslim military of Pakistan.  This greatly multiplied the number of 
refugees fleeing into India.  The Awami League leaders were arrested or killed because 
East Pakistan wanted autonomy as the independent country of Bangladesh.  India’s 
support of the Bengali people escalated into Indian military intervention with forces 
crossing into East Pakistan; an act of war against Yahya Khan.   
As the Soviet Union sponsored Indian aggression against Pakistan by supplying 
military arms, Nixon and Kissinger wondered if détente with the Russians was even 
possible.  A Soviet treaty with India on the eve of war with Pakistan while Washington 
and Moscow were planning a summit meeting on arms reduction revealed that Soviet 
ambition was relentless.  The Soviet Union could leverage the South Asia Crisis to its 
advantage in order to reveal American weakness.  If the Americans refrained from 
intervention on behalf of Pakistan in order to secure détente with the Soviets, then it 
would increase the impression of American weakness.  If America appeared to desire 
peace at all costs then it would cause détente to fail because the U.S. would not be able to 
negotiate with other nations from a position of strength; a situation the Soviets would 
certainly exploit to their advantage.   
Nixon and Kissinger were statesmen that were confident they could address the 
challenging issues of the Cold War with poise and tact.  Their memoirs present an image 
of the two men as cool in a crisis and in control, but the South Asia Crisis of 1971 proved 
that war between India and Pakistan, and the superpower alliances it involved, threatened 
to unravel détente.  Nixon and Kissinger found themselves reacting to urgent situations 
more than they initiated events as the crisis unfolded.  In private conversations Nixon and 
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Kissinger raged against India for avoiding peace proposals and threatening war, thereby 
endangering détente.  The South Asia Crisis showed that even when the diplomatic 
visionaries like Nixon and Kissinger played their roles to perfection, there was still much 
left to fate.   
China and Pakistan were allies, the U.S. had treaty obligations and firm alliances 
to Pakistan, and India held a casual alliance with the Soviet Union because it desired to 
maintain an unaligned status.  After news of Kissinger’s secret trip to China in July of 
1971 had been broadcast globally, he presented a veiled threat to India implying a 
triangle alliance of the U.S., Pakistan, and China against India should India decide to 
invade East Pakistan.  Indira Gandhi became belligerent.  A more secure alliance with the 
Soviets would be sought by India immediately. Unaligned India solidly aligned itself 
with the Soviet Union in August.  Kissinger’s implication of Indian isolation was meant 
to preserve the peace and protect détente by intimidating Indira Gandhi into a peaceful 
attitude.  Instead, it provided the Soviet Union with a significant opportunity to engage its 
Cold War opponents using India as a proxy.  The Soviets invested massive amounts of 
military hardware into India as Gandhi prepared for war with Pakistan.  Kissinger’s plan 
to protect détente by intimidating Gandhi resulted in greatly endangering détente.     
In truth, India had nothing to fear from Kissinger’s visit to China.  Nixon had no 
designs against India.  He merely sought to take advantage of Pakistan’s alliance with 
China in order to build détente.  When it came to détente Nixon and Kissinger both 
understood that without a China trip there would not be a Moscow trip.
144
  A U.S. 
relationship with China would soften the Soviets when it came to détente and Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks because they would not want to risk a U.S./Chinese alliance 
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against them.  Without the leverage of a China trip Moscow may not be too interested in 
American proposals.  As the Pakistan civil war evolved into the South Asia Crisis the 
Nixon administration, Pakistan, and China were on one side of the equation, while the 
odd combination of India, the U.S. Congress, the U.S. media, the international 
community, and eventually the Soviet Union were on the other. 
The Soviet Union did not remain passive when political opportunities arose, and 
as events unfolded the Soviets tested America’s resolve regarding obligations to its allies.  
Henry Kissinger explained that the Soviet Union was known to throw a lighted match on 
a powder keg if it would be favorable to its own interests.
145
  When the Russians backed 
India in August 1971 a weakened Pakistan was confronted by an emboldened India.  
Soviet support maximized the aggressiveness of India’s political and military machinery.  
According to Kissinger, the Soviets seized a strategic opportunity and sought to humiliate 
Pakistan which was a friend of both the U.S. and China.
146
  If either the U.S. or China 
failed to come to the aid of Pakistan while having alliances firmly in place, it would 
prove they were impotent.
147
  This would humiliate both the U.S. and China in the eyes 
of the world for backing down in the face of Soviet-sponsored aggression as India 
crushed Pakistan’s military.  If the U.S. or China failed to assist Pakistan when 
confronted by the superior forces of India it could put doubt in the hearts of all U.S. and 
Chinese allies regarding the reliability and trustworthiness of these two superpowers.  By 
significantly increasing military support to India in the middle of the South Asia Crisis, 
the Russians manipulated the crisis to their own advantage, and tested American resolve 
regarding détente.  
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The South Asia Crisis threatened détente due to the hawkish attitude of Indira 
Gandhi as the crisis escalated.  She had moved past any desire for a peaceful solution to 
the plight of the Bengali people, and prepared for war.  In addition, the Soviet Union 
seized an opportunity to crush Pakistan and damage the prestige of both the U.S. and 
Communist China.  Nixon and Kissinger saw a threat not just to East Pakistan, but to all 
of Pakistan.  The South Asia Crisis threatened détente by forcing the U.S. into a defense 
of Pakistan against a determined and aggressive Indian/Soviet alliance.  Nixon and 
Kissinger may have appeared to be confident statesmen during the crisis in their 
memoirs, but the two men were actually consumed with trying to find solutions to 
complicated problems without the promise of success.  Some historians argue that Nixon 
made the crisis into a global Cold War confrontation when it was actually just a regional 
war.  This chapter will give evidence that Nixon and Kissinger were correct in their 
assessment that India intended to crush the entire nation of Pakistan once the East was 
defeated.  Rather than Nixon’s paranoia, it was Soviet opportunism that escalated the 
South Asia Crisis into a global Cold War confrontation.    
The developing crisis caused two major threats to détente when the U.S. Congress 
went over Nixon’s head in its dealings with Pakistan, and the U.S. Ambassador to India 
decided to defend India.  These internal moves by members of Nixon’s own government 
could have potentially jeopardized Nixon’s relationship with Yahya Khan.  Nixon’s 
people were working against him as world opinion was mounting against Yahya and 
Pakistan.  Nixon and Kissinger realized that using Yahya Khan as the sole diplomatic 
channel to the Chinese government was hazardous.  Nixon could be manipulated into 
actions he wished to avoid in order to keep Yahya willing to mediate, and if Yahya were 
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to fall from power the channel would close.  It was therefore necessary for Kissinger to 
insure that the U.S. and China developed additional channels of communication as soon 
as possible in order to protect the détente initiative. 
The Pakistani civil war caused the U.S. Congress to take action against Yahya 
Khan.  This threatened Nixon’s “one time” sale of military equipment to Pakistan 
involving armored personnel carriers, modified patrol aircraft, F-104 fighter planes, and 
B-57 bombers.
148
  This sale had occurred during peacetime in South Asia, but when 
Yahya Khan began to move his troops into East Pakistan to suppress a national uprising, 
the U.S. Congress suspended all military aid to Pakistan.  The Democratic Congress did 
not want to see West Pakistan using American military equipment against the East 
Pakistani people.  This Congressional move was done apart from White House 
sponsorship as reports of abuses by Yahya’s forces increased.  Senator Walter F. 
Mondale of Minnesota said at the time, “There is something very wrong when guns, 
tanks, and planes supplied by the United States are used against the very people they are 
supposed to protect.”
149
  These weapons that Mondale mentioned were obsolete by 
modern standards, as they had been supplied prior to 1965 under CENTO and SEATO.  
When Congress received reports of West Pakistani atrocities, it wanted to remove 
American weapons from the hands of Yahya Khan until the situation in East Pakistan had 
been resolved. 
Beyond Congressional restraints, Kenneth B. Keating, the U.S. Ambassador to 
India during the first Nixon administration, had strong leanings toward India and was 
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deeply sympathetic toward India’s mounting refugee crisis.  In May 1971 the U.S. 
Ambassador to Pakistan, Joseph Farland, pointed out to Henry Kissinger, that 
“Ambassador Keating seems to have gone berserk…he has violated security and appears 
determined to break Pakistan…he recently called in a New York Times reporter and, 
(told) him the essence of Blood’s report.”
150
  Keating did not know that Kissinger and 
Nixon had plans to visit China within the next year, nor did he understand Nixon’s 
special relationship with Yahya Khan.  On June 4, Nixon and Kissinger agreed “that 
Keating had effectively become an advocate” for the Indian government.
151
  Nixon had 
told Keating that the U.S. should not become involved in an internal Pakistani conflict, 
but Nixon doubted that Keating would hold to that course.
152
  Keating’s opposition to 
Pakistan complicated Nixon’s détente efforts.   
If Yahya Khan felt that the U.S. was wavering in its commitment to Pakistan by 
withholding military aid it had already been promised, and if he saw division developing 
in Nixon’s government regarding Pakistan, it could cause him to hesitate in his 
willingness to mediate between the U.S. and China.  This created a potential threat to 
détente.  Keating’s actions were presenting a picture of a divided U.S. government, and 
Nixon needed to address this problem so that Yahya would not waver in his commitment.  
At a Washington meeting with Nixon and Kissinger on June 15, the President chided 
Keating by asking him, “Where are your sandals?”
153
  Keating advocated for India and 
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 “Conversation Among President Nixon, his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the 
Ambassador to India (Keating), Washington, June 15
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explained that the refugee influx from East Pakistan to India had reached five million, 
and of that number about three million were settling in Calcutta.
154
  Keating explained 
that Calcutta was about the size of New York, and the present refugee situation would 
“be like dumping three million people into New York, except that Calcutta is in much 
worse shape than New York.”
155
  Keating added that the latest he had heard was that the 
refugee population in India increased by 150,000 each day, “because they’re killing the 
Hindus” in East Pakistan.
156
  West Pakistan had also targeted the East Pakistan 
intellectual leaders and had “outlawed the Awami League” and killed its leadership.
157
  
Keating suggested taking $25 million out of U.S. aid for Pakistan and giving it to 
India.
158
  Soon afterward, Keating left the meeting while Nixon and Kissinger continued 
the conversation alone.  Kissinger told Nixon that to take Pakistan’s aid and give it to 
India “would be considered such an insult by Yahya that the whole deal would be off.”
159
  
Kissinger “was referring to Pakistan’s role as intermediary in the contacts that were 
developing with China.”
160
   
Keating had made legitimate points regarding the intolerable actions of Yahya’s 
military, and Nixon knew his recommendations were justified, but Nixon could not 
follow Keating’s advice lest it destroy détente.  Kissinger’s visit to China was only weeks 
away and Nixon needed Yahya’s cooperation, which prevented him from speaking out 
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against his actions.  Nixon and Kissinger understood that Keating’s sympathies toward 
India were reasonable, and that Pakistan was behaving in an increasingly villainous 
manner.  Yet, Nixon’s desire to protect détente caused him to maintain his silence.  In 
order to provide more political latitude, Kissinger promised that when he talked to the 
Chinese the following month he would set up a different channel of communication 
besides Yahya, so that the U.S. was not so vulnerable to having its diplomatic 
communications with the Chinese collapse.
161
  After Henry Kissinger’s China visit in 
July, 1971, he and the Chinese agreed to two new channels of communication apart from 
Yahya Khan.  The first of these would be in Paris.  Kissinger was in Paris regularly to 
negotiate with the North Vietnamese, so China arranged for Kissinger to use the Chinese 
ambassador, Huang Chen, as a direct link to Peking.  General Vernon A. Walters would 
deliver messages from Kissinger and Nixon to Huang Chen in Paris, and they would in 
turn be communicated to Peking.
162
  A second channel of communication was also 
opened using Huang Hua, Permanent Representative of the People’s Republic of China to 
the United Nations.
163
  Kissinger said that “Peking had agreed that we could use Huang 
Hua in New York as a contact on U.N. matters or for emergency messages; the rest of our 
business was to be conducted through Paris.”
164
  The new U.N. and Paris channels to 
China helped protect détente by providing multiple ways for Washington and Peking to 
communicate, and also insured that détente with China would continue if Yahya fell from 
power. 
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The international community believed that India had sufficient grounds to 
intervene in East Pakistan because of the massive refugee influx it had experienced.  
India had protected the Bengali people from Yahya’s military who had suppressed 
democracy and murdered innocent people.  India cared for millions of Pakistani refugees, 
and aided the Mukti Bahini freedom fighters whom India and the international 
community believed were involved in a just cause.  By late August 1971 the refugee flow 
from East Pakistan into India totaled seven million.
165
  This number would reach 10 
million by November.  Few believed India had any plans beyond helping Mujibur 
Rahman and the Bengali people to establish a safe and independent homeland, then 
allowing the refugees to return home.   
The U.S. understood that tensions between India and Pakistan were rapidly 
escalating as the summer of 1971 approached.  In a memorandum to Henry Kissinger on 
May 25, 1971 he was made aware that “there is strong and mounting public pressure in 
India to take direct action against the Pakistanis over the refugee problem.”
166
  The 
memorandum explained that “Mrs. Gandhi warned that Pakistan must provide “credible 
guarantees” for the return and future safety of the refugees.”
167
  She also warned “that 
unless the great powers take action to remedy the situation, India will be “constrained to 
take all measures that might be necessary” to safeguard its own well-being.”
168
  India’s 
resolve for direct military intervention inside Pakistan was growing.  In an ominous 
                                                          
165
 “Memorandum From Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s 
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976 
Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 135, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-
76v11/d135 (accessed January 24, 2012). 
166
“ Memorandum From Samuel Hoskinson and Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff 
to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1969-1976 Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 57, 







picture of future developments the memo alleged that Prime Minister Gandhi had 
“ordered her army to prepare a plan for a rapid take-over of East Pakistan and is said to 
be particularly interested in an “Israeli-type lightning thrust.”
169
   
Indira Gandhi formulated a military campaign similar to what Israel had done in 
the Six-Day War of 1967.  In June of 1967 Israel had preempted an attack by Egypt, 
Syria, and Jordan by initiating a simultaneous lightning strike against enemy airbases, 
catching enemy warplanes on their runways.
170
  The Israeli devastation of enemy air 
power, 309 of 340 Egyptian aircraft destroyed, freed Israeli ground troops for 
simultaneous attacks.
171
  Israeli warplanes were free to fly unhindered.  Egypt and Syria 
had no time to organize for a defensive war.  The Egyptian troops were dug in so deep on 
the Israeli border that those bypassed by Israeli forces could not aid those attacked.
172
   In 
six days Israel had significantly increased the size of its territory and had seized large 
amounts of Soviet-built military equipment from the enemy.
173
  Israel was actually 
stronger after the war than it was prior to the war, which was an event almost 
unprecedented in military history.
174
  The Six-Day War had given the Soviet Union a 
bloody nose in the heart of the Cold War and established Israel as a credible and capable 
military power.  In the South Asia Crisis, Gandhi wanted to apply this same military 
strategy against Pakistan.  As the South Asia Crisis mounted, India planned a lightning 
military thrust into East Pakistan to quickly control territory, seize enemy assets, and 
immobilize enemy troops.   If her plan worked, the war would be over before the rest of 
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the world had time to fully understand what had taken place.  Gandhi would provide the 
military backing to enable the East Pakistan resistance fighters, the Mukti Bahini, to 
successfully defeat Yahya’s forces and then establish their own independent country of 
Bangladesh.   
Yahya accused India of interfering in the sovereign affairs of Pakistan, hoping 
that Nixon would use his influence with India to pressure Gandhi to cease.  By the 
summer of 1971 Yahya Khan insisted that India continually interfered in the internal 
affairs of Pakistan and that India’s actions made the refugee problem worse.  On June 28, 
U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Joseph Farland, said that Yahya thought “Mrs. Gandhi had 
instigated the current problems through clandestine plotting with Mujib.”
175
  Yahya said 
dealing with the refugee problem and getting them back to their homes would be much 
easier “if India would stop giving support to armed resistance” in East Pakistan.
176
  A 
distinct contradictory nature in India’s actions arose as the crisis intensified.  India 
repeatedly focused on the problem of the refugees as the reason for its involvement in 
East Pakistan, but India’s support of the Mukti Bahini guerilla fighters sustained the flow 
of refugees into India with constant warfare with Yahya’s troops in East Pakistan.  India 
“took no responsibility for the Bengali guerillas’ contribution to the chaos,” even when 
“they were recruited on Indian soil, trained by Indian officers, equipped with Indian arms, 
and supported by Indian artillery from the Indian side of the frontier.”
177
  India 
persistently claimed the guerillas were not under their control.
178
  In a White House 
                                                          
175
 “Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State,” Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1969-1976 Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 81, 









meeting with Nixon and Kissinger on July 28, Ambassador Joseph Farland said Yahya 
had told him that his intelligence had pinpointed twenty-nine guerilla training camps in 
India.
179
  The guerilla threat was growing by leaps and bounds,
180
  meaning that India’s 
intervention could quickly lead to war.  India held the refugees safely inside its borders, 
reviewing military plans to invade, and training the Mukti Bahini freedom fighters.  
Gandhi demanded a solution to the refugee crisis in India, but sustained it by her actions. 
Indira Gandhi had determined that she needed to take charge of the chaotic 
situation in East Pakistan.  Her intention to intervene militarily on behalf of the Bengali 
people increased and she stalled any serious peace negotiations.  With the sympathies of 
the international community behind her, Gandhi became emboldened to make demands 
on behalf of the Bengali people and to place conditions on agreements.  India trained and 
equipped the Bengali militia.  Gandhi held Pakistani refugees in India and would not 
allow them to return to East Pakistan until Yahya could guarantee that the Bengali people 
would become independent and that their safety could be guaranteed.  Kissinger 
suggested that because India is “hooking a refugee solution to an overall political 
solution,” it implies that India is “using the refugees for political purposes.”
181
  Gandhi 
determined to keep the refugees in India until immediate independence was declared for 
Bangladesh, which India knew could not occur quickly.  The refugees had become tied to 
India’s political demands for Bangladesh.  In a Washington meeting on November 12,
 
1971, Kissinger summarized the situation by saying, “India claims this is a Pakistani 
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problem, but they are deliberately creating conditions which make it insoluble.”
182
  
Kissinger and Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, speculated that India actually 
desired war.  Kissinger argued that “India will never again get the Paks in such a weak 
position.”
183
  A lightning war in East Pakistan, resulting in a quick Indian victory, could 
also bring about the fall of West Pakistan.  Kissinger explained that when Sisco started an 
appeasement policy with India regarding its demands for Bangladesh, “India immediately 
escalated their demands, so that they were not possibly fulfillable in the existing time 
frame.”
184
  Kissinger and Sisco believed that India applied constant pressure to Yahya in 
order to “suck Pakistan in militarily.”
185
  If India could trigger a military response by 
Pakistan against India in West Pakistan, then Indian could blame Pakistan for escalating 
the war and freely retaliate without being accused of initiating hostilities.   
The greatest external threat to détente involved Indira Gandhi’s treaty with the 
Soviets on the eve of war with Pakistan.  In order to apply pressure to India so that 
Gandhi would be more agreeable to peace negotiations, Kissinger issued a warning to the 
Indian Ambassador to the U.S., Lakshmi Kant Jha.  He explained that America would not 
support India should China decide to attack his country during the South Asia Crisis.  
Kissinger said “that the United States Government would consider any Chinese invasion 
of India” that occurred as a result of Indian invasion of East Pakistan “as entirely 
different from the Chinese invasion (of India) in 1962, and that the U.S. Government 
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would provide no support to India, either military or political, in that event.”
186
  This 
warning to India came in the same month as Kissinger’s visit to China.  India saw itself 
as the target of a U.S., Chinese, and Pakistani alliance against it.  It meant that if India 
wished to pursue its interests in East Pakistan, it would face both America and China as 
allies of Pakistan.  When Gandhi realized that Kissinger was implying a U.S./Chinese 
partnership against India on the heels of Kissinger’s secret trip to Peking (July 9-11), 
India acted accordingly in its own defense.   
Rather than having the desired effect of pressuring India to negotiate for peace, 
Kissinger’s warning backfired, and Gandhi immediately signed a treaty with the Soviet 
Union.  In New Delhi on August 9, 1971, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko 
and Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh signed a “Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and 
Cooperation”
187
 that would last for twenty years.  The treaty was “an important Soviet 
initiative to gain greater influence over the course of events in South Asia,” and it assured 
India that the Soviet Union would provide significant support in the event of war.
188
  The 
Russians immediately began to provide massive military aid to India, giving the Soviets a 
significant voice in what was happening in East Pakistan.  India could now pursue its 
interests with the backing of an ally feared by both the U.S. and China.  With the promise 
of Soviet backing, India knew it could bring a permanent conclusion to the problem of 
Pakistan.  Soviet opportunism in South Asia on the heels of Kissinger’s China visit 
                                                          
186
 “Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to eh President’s Assistant for National 
Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976 Volume XI, South Asia 
Crisis, 1971, Document 110, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11/d110 (accessed 
January 23, 2012). 
187
 “Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Irwin to President Nixon,” Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1969-1976 Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 116, 





demonstrated that the Russians were confident they could handle a U.S./Chinese alliance 
against them.  Their backing of India escalated the South Asia Crisis and aggravated Cold 
War tensions which seriously threatened the future of détente.   
The South Asia Crisis had reached a point where the leaders of Pakistan and India 
were taking actions that accelerated the likelihood of war rather than lessening it.  In the 
same month that the Soviets and Indians signed their treaty of friendship, Yahya Khan 
decided that Mujibur Rahman of the Awami League would face charges of treason, 
which implied a possible death sentence.  Rahman was an elected representative of the 
Awami League, with overwhelming support in East Pakistan.  Yahya’s trial of Mujib 
would aggravate an already volatile situation.  Indira Gandhi appealed to the U.S. to use 
its influence to help Yahya Khan “to take a realistic view” of the situation.
189
  Nixon 
pointed out that since Ambassador Farland had a good personal relationship with Yahya, 
he might suggest to Yahya that “not shooting Mujib”
190
 would be wise.  Farland learned 
that Yahya had decided that the trial would “be conducted with the greatest care,” and 
“that because the charge carried the possibility of a death sentence,” it was Yahya’s plan 
to accept a petition for mercy on Rahman’s behalf, if convicted, and then “sit on it for a 
few months…until power could be turned over to a civilian government.”
191
  Once a 
civilian government was in charge of Mujibur’s mercy plea, “there was little or no 
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possibility that Mujibur would be executed.”
192
  Farland said that Yahya had given the 
matter “considerable thought,” to which Yahya replied, “I have, and you can stop 
worrying because I am not going to execute the man even though he is a traitor.”
193
  
Ambassador Farland spoke to Yahya at Nixon’s request, but Nixon was careful not to 
speak of the matter himself to Yahya so that there could be no potential repercussions 
that would affect détente.   
Nixon and Kissinger might have better understood why Indira Gandhi opted for a 
treaty with the Soviets and refused to negotiate for peace with Pakistan by taking a close 
look at her family history.  The South Asia Crisis demonstrated a generational cycle of 
political retaliation between Pakistan and India.  In 1964, Pakistan President Ayub Khan 
had tried to pressure the United Nations to rule in Pakistan’s favor regarding the disputed 
region of Kashmir.  Kashmir had long been coveted by both Pakistan and India for its 
natural beauty, lakes, and climate.  This U.N. appeal by Ayub was done at a time when 
India was politically weakened due to the fact that India’s Prime Minister, Jawaharlal 
Nehru, was in failing health.  Ayub took advantage of India’s political weakness and 
attempted to seize Kashmir.  This opportunistic tendency was not forgotten by Indira 
Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru’s daughter, when she became Prime Minister of India (1966).  
In 1971 Indira Gandhi had the opportunity to repay Pakistan for its political maneuvers to 
gain Kashmir while her father, Jawaharlal Nehru, was near death.  As Ayub Khan had 
used India’s weakness to attempt the seizure of Kashmir for Pakistan, Gandhi later had 
opportunity to exploit Yahya’s political weakness and could attempt to seize Kashmir for 
India.  Gandhi trained and equipped the East Pakistan freedom fighters during their 1971 







civil war against Yahya Khan.  She also fought for them politically and harbored the 
interim government of Bangladesh in India while Mujib Rahman was imprisoned.  
Gandhi’s refusals to negotiate a peaceful solution when peace was within reach implied 
Indian motives went beyond settling the issues of the Bengali people.  Mrs. Gandhi took 
advantage of Pakistan’s political weakness as Ayub Khan had done.  This illustrates a 
cycle of political retaliation based on ancient wounds between the two countries that 
Nixon did not fully grasp and perhaps could not fully understand when he began his 
détente initiative.   
Nixon and Kissinger presented concrete peace proposals to Indira Gandhi to 
protect détente and to avoid a confrontation between superpower nations, but she showed 
no interest in their proposals when she visited the U.S. during her international tour in 
early November.  Based on intelligence reports Kissinger had received, he believed that 
she would use her visit with the American President as a cover for an imminent attack on 
Pakistan.
194
  In Washington on November 4, Nixon discussed with Gandhi the return of 
refugees to Pakistan and a mutual withdrawal of military forces by India and Pakistan.  
These possibilities were brushed aside by Indira Gandhi during her U.S. visit.  Gandhi 
offered no assurances that her country desired to avoid war.  The following morning 
Nixon and Kissinger privately expressed deep resentment toward Gandhi, and distrust of 
India.  Mrs. Gandhi knew that Yahya had agreed to meet with a representative of the 
Awami League, who would be pre-approved by Mujibur Rahman, but she did not pay 
much attention to this offer.  Kissinger believed that “the Indians are bastards anyway.  
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They are starting a war over there…”
195
  Mrs. “Gandhi did not respond to Nixon’s 
proposal of the previous day to consider a withdrawal of forces from the borders of India 
and Pakistan.”
196
  Troop withdrawal was not something that India was considering in 
November.  Nixon and Kissinger believed that Gandhi’s indifference toward their peace 
proposals meant that she had determined to go to war with Pakistan, confirming their 
suspicions, and endangering détente by creating Cold War tensions based on the South 
Asian alliances.  
Nixon believed that India was intent on invading West Pakistan once East 
Pakistan was defeated.  America was willing to work with Gandhi to establish an 
independent Bangladesh because it was an obvious political evolution that was 
unavoidable.  An independent Bangladesh seemed inevitable, and the U.S. agreed to 
accept this conclusion.  This rendered war between India and Pakistan completely 
unnecessary, but Indira Gandhi showed no interest in avoiding a war.  To the contrary, 
her actions indicated war was imminent.  India had no need to send its armies into East 
Pakistan because the international community had pledged to help India with the refugee 
hardship.  Legitimate peace negotiations were also available to all parties.  When Gandhi 
ignored opportunities to negotiate a peace, and made up her mind to invade East Pakistan, 
Nixon was convinced that there were more sinister motives at work.  Kissinger and 
Nixon believed it was “India’s determination to use the crisis to establish its preeminence 
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  President Nixon told his key leaders in July, 1971, that Keating 
believed world opinion was on the side of the Indians.
198
  Nixon observed that this 
assessment was probably correct, but added that the Indians are “a slippery, treacherous 
people,” and he felt that the Indians “would like nothing better than to use this tragedy to 
destroy Pakistan.”
199
  Nixon and Kissinger believed that the U.S. diplomatic efforts had 
made war easily avoidable if India desired it, but India did not desire peace.  India was 
using the refugee situation as a pretext for war against Yahya in which it was certain to 
come out the victor.   
Nixon and Kissinger speculated that Indira Gandhi had made up her mind to 
invade Pakistan before her arrival in Washington.  India had assumed the moral high 
ground in the eyes of the international community; therefore, any actions taken against 
Pakistan by India would be free of reprimand.  The Nixon administration concluded that 
India planned to invade East Pakistan, establish an independent Bangladesh, move its 
forces into West Pakistan to crush the Pakistan military, and then move to seize Kashmir 
and further dismember Pakistan.   Backed by the Soviets, India would make a strategic 
move to cripple all of Pakistan in order to establish itself as the superior power in South 
Asia.  Indira Gandhi began to manipulate India’s responses in order to stall for time when 
it came to finding peace with Pakistan.  Gandhi’s  demand for “credible guarantees” from 
Pakistan on behalf of the refugees, and her escalation of demands gave the impression of 
a strategy to avoid a ceasefire and keep all refugees inside India.  This provided India 
with time to position its military while training and fully equipping the Mukti Bahini.  
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Part of Gandhi’s military plan involved the safety of Pakistani refugees in India, so she 
could not allow the refugees to return to East Pakistan if war was imminent.  It was 
important for her to keep the refugees in India and out of harm’s way as she prepared for 
war with Pakistan.   
India’s belligerence, encouraged by the Soviets, threatened to unravel détente.  
Should India invade East Pakistan and then threaten to invade West Pakistan as well, a 
confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union would be unavoidable.  
This confrontation had no predictable result for Nixon and it could destroy détente.  The 
attempts made by Nixon and Kissinger to defuse the South Asia Crisis up to this point 
turned out to be ineffective.  Nixon’s efforts to establish peace between India and 
Pakistan to protect détente had failed.  Nixon and Kissinger were merely reacting to 
events rather than guiding their course.  As statesmen, the two men found their skills 
stretched to the limit, and much would still be left to chance. 
The Soviet Union had given India the military backing to initiate war with 
Pakistan and confront the potential of a U.S., Chinese, and Pakistani alliance against it.  
On November 22, 1971, Pakistani radio broadcasts announced that India had launched an 
all-out offensive against East Pakistan without a formal declaration of war.
200
  Pakistan 
alleged that the attack included infantry, armor, and aircraft, while the Indians branded 
these reports as “absolutely false.”
201
  Without a formal declaration of war from either 
side it was difficult to know who had initiated hostilities.  In a meeting of the Washington 
Special Actions Group on November 23, Kissinger declared that India had launched an 
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offensive in conjunction with the Mukti Bahini guerilla fighters, and provided air and 
ground support for them to accomplish their objectives.  Kissinger said in the meeting, 
“There is no way guerillas could get tanks and aircraft and be operating in brigade 
formation.  We can play this charade only so long.”
202
  Kissinger was convinced that it 
made no sense for India to claim that Pakistan had started the conflict.  Pakistan had 
twelve planes to India’s 200.  Kissinger said it would be like the “Germans claiming they 
were attacked by the Lithuanians.”
203
  The following day in a subsequent meeting with 
the same group Kissinger asked, “Is there any doubt in the mind of anyone in this room 
that the Indians have attacked with regular units across the Pakistan border?...Can we 
possibly believe that these are guerillas attacking across hundreds of miles, with tanks 
and aircraft, that this is an indigenous movement?”
204
  The lack of a formal declaration of 
war kept Pakistan’s allies confused until India could seize East Pakistan and establish an 
independent government in Bangladesh.  President Yahya Khan by this time wanted “to 
wash his hands of the situation” by proceeding with the election of a civilian leader 
intending to turn “the situation over to (Zulfikar) Bhutto.”
205
   
Nixon decided to “tilt” U.S. policy toward Pakistan in early December despite 
pro-India sentiment in the U.S. Congress, the news media, and most of the U.S. 
government bureaucracy.  Nixon wanted to publicly express U.S. displeasure with India.  
He wanted his press secretaries to do a background report on how India had refused to 
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agree to any of the legitimate steps his administration had taken to avoid war in South 
Asia.  He was determined to cut off all aid to India.  Nixon had previously stated, “If 
there is a war, I will go on national television and ask Congress to cut off all aid to India.  
They won’t get a dime.”
206
  Nixon’s tilt toward Pakistan was not apparent quickly enough 
for the President in government press statements.  In a meeting of the Washington 
Special Actions Group on December 3, Kissinger told those in attendance, “I’ve been 
catching unshirted hell every half-hour from the President who says we’re not tough 
enough…He really doesn’t believe we’re carrying out his wishes.  He wants to tilt toward 
Pakistan, and he believes that every briefing or statement is going the other way.”
207
   
Nixon also attempted to get military equipment for Pakistan from other parts of 
the world because of Congressional restrictions on any U.S. military aid to Pakistan.  
Nixon authorized Kissinger to negotiate with the Shah of Iran, with “the understanding 
that any “back channel” military assistance provided to Pakistan by Iran would be offset 
by comparable assistance provided to Iran by the United States.”
208
  It turned out “that in 
light of the treaty of friendship signed by India and the Soviet Union,” the Shah of Iran 
“could not send Iranian aircraft and pilots to Pakistan.”
209
  The Jordanians replied that 
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they would “send four aircraft with Jordanian pilots immediately to Pakistan,” and up to 
twenty-two planes once Jordan had a grasp of the operation.
210
  The Turks agreed to 
provide six F-5s if the U.S. agreed.
211
  China would also send warplanes, but these 
armaments could not change the final outcome of the war.  According to General 
Alexander Haig, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, India 
and the Mukti Bahini had received massive amounts of Soviet equipment.
212
 In addition 
to this support, India had its own military arms production capabilities, and Indian forces 
outnumbered Pakistan in equipment and troops.   
Both India and Pakistan increased military forces on their western borders as the 
war between them progressed, triggering an expanded war.  India had demonstrated an 
aggressive intent by escalating its military presence on West Pakistan’s borders, so 
Yahya decided to preempt instead of waiting for an attack in a location of India’s 
choosing.  On December 3, Pakistan launched airstrikes on Indian airbases inside India in 
Kashmir and the Punjab region.
213
  Yahya was provoked into action by the presence of 
India’s military already in East Pakistan, and the threatening buildup of India’s forces on 
his western borders.  Conflict took place beyond East Pakistan in the regions of Kashmir 
and in West Pakistan based on what the U.S. would call the Indian method of “sucking 
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 to a war.  The constant goading of Pakistan by India provoked this 
airstrike against Indian airbases.  Nixon and Kissinger believed that the Indians would 
use this as a justification to attack West Pakistan and Kashmir.  Kissinger later confirmed 
that he had a “whole file of intelligence reports which makes it unmistakably clear that 
the Indian strategy was to knock over West Pakistan.”
215
  According to Kissinger, if India 
succeeded in destroying Pakistan’s army, tanks, artillery, and air force, then “Pakistan 
would be in their paws.”
216
 There would be nothing to prevent India from having its will 
in Pakistan, and settling issues completely according to its own interests.   
When Yahya attacked Indian airfields in Kashmir, India had the green light it 
desired to take out West Pakistan’s oil reserves in Karachi.  After Yahya’s airstrikes, 
Gandhi immediately said “that Pakistan had launched a full-scale attack against India,” 
and “that Pakistan’s Air Force had struck at six India airfields in Kashmir and…that 
Pakistani artillery was shelling Indian positions…”
217
  India in turn felt justified in 
attacking two West Pakistan oil company dumps in Karachi, producing a nasty fire that 
the Pakistanis could not put out.
218
  Destroying Pakistan’s oil reserves would bring a 
rapid conclusion to any military action by Yahya Khan.  India did not attack Pakistan’s 
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oil reserves in the West until Yahya had made the first move against India in a region 
apart from East Pakistan.  The Indian military strategy was to goad the Pakistanis into a 
conflict and then hammer them to death militarily as a result.  This enabled India to 
maintain the support of the international community by alleging that Pakistan had started 
hostilities.   
Nixon’s disregard of Gandhi’s desire for him to confront the atrocities of Yahya 
Khan had caused the South Asia Crisis.  Gandhi held to her conviction that U.S. collusion 
with Pakistan had triggered Indian intervention.  As war progressed, Gandhi maintained 
that India had acted morally, and expressed genuine surprise that Nixon could think that 
India had caused the crisis.  She wrote Nixon that “the world press, radio, and television 
have faithfully recorded the story”
219
 of the struggling Bengali people.  Gandhi said 
regarding Nixon’s actions, “it was heartbreaking to find that while there was sympathy 
for the poor refugees, the disease itself was ignored.”
220
  This referred to Nixon’s 
willingness to provide aid for the Bengali refugees, but his refusal to confront Yahya 
Khan and get him to restrain his military.  Gandhi explained that “war could also have 
been avoided if the power, influence and authority of…the United States had got Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman released.”
221
  She noted, “We are deeply hurt by the…insinuations that 
it was we who have precipitated the crisis and have in any way thwarted the emergence 
of solutions.”
222
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Nixon replied to Gandhi’s letter immediately because he wanted the public record 
to show that he had done a great deal to prevent war, but that Gandhi had resisted these 
attempts.  He said, “When we met in Washington you were assured of our intention to 
continue to carry the main financial burden for care of the refugees.”
223
  Nixon also 
mentioned he had discussed with her the various ways to begin talks between the 
government representatives of Pakistan and Bangladesh, and that the government of 
Pakistan was willing “to take the first step of military disengagement if…India would 
reciprocate.”
224
  These proposals did not meet India’s requirements fully, but “they were 
proposals that would have started the process of negotiations”
225
 and avoided war.  Nixon 
insisted that India had resisted these steps and determined instead to go to war.  Gandhi’s 
preconditions to peace involved the release of Mujibur Rahman and the immediate 
independence of Bangladesh.  Her demands left little room for negotiation.  Gandhi had 
made peace negotiations insoluble.  The point of Nixon’s letter was to explain to Gandhi 
that he felt she was to blame for the South Asia Crisis rather than the United States 
because she believed she had the right to intervene in the affairs of a sovereign Pakistan.   
In a move that only a few months earlier would have ruined Nixon’s hopes of 
having Yahya act as the intermediary between the U.S. and China, Nixon and the United 
States government hesitated to honor its treaty obligations to Pakistan in a time of war.  
Pakistan was fighting for its very life against a superior Indian army with heavy Soviet 
military support.  The U.N. and Paris channels of communication to China that Kissinger 
had set up during his visit enabled Nixon to remain aloof during the South Asia Crisis 
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instead of being forced to intervene to secure détente’s only channel to China.  Yet, 
Nixon understood that the South Asia Crisis needed to be contained and ended as soon as 
possible in order to protect détente.  Continuation of the war by India threatened the 
destruction of West Pakistan and a direct confrontation between the United States and the 
Soviet Union.  Such a confrontation could destroy all that Nixon had worked to obtain 
regarding détente, SALT 1, and also the Moscow summit scheduled for the spring of 
1972.   
Diplomatic efforts were consistently made by the United States to end the South 
Asia Crisis quickly, but Nixon received intense pressure from Pakistan to do more.  As 
the South Asia Crisis evolved into full scale war between Pakistan and India across their 
Eastern and Western borders, Yahya Khan invoked Article I of the 1959 Pakistan-United 
States Bilateral Agreement of Co-operation.
226
  In a telegram to President Nixon, Yahya 
asked the U.S. to honor its treaty obligations “in keeping with the solemn agreements 
signed with them, to meet this formidable challenge.”
227
  Yahya desired the U.S. to do for 
Pakistan what it was doing for South Vietnam, but Nixon faced Congressional restraints 
against helping Pakistan militarily and the Nixon doctrine made it clear that sending U.S. 
military personnel to Pakistan was out of the question.  Pakistan’s membership in 
CENTO had promised U.S. military assistance against direct Russian or Chinese attack, 
but it did not include American military backing in the case of an attack from India.  With 
his forces outnumbered, Yahya Khan pleaded with President Nixon “to issue a stern 
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warning to Russia and India to stop aggression against Pakistan.”
228
  Yahya continued: 
“There is also urgent need for material assistance from the United States of America, 
directly or indirectly…”
229
  Nixon immediately replied to Yahya’s message, explaining 
that the U.S. was involved in major diplomatic activities to end the crisis as soon as 
possible, but there was no mention of military assistance for Pakistan in Nixon’s letter.
230
   
The U.S. began engaging in legal maneuvers to avoid helping Pakistan militarily 
when it was clear that the U.S. had moral obligations to Pakistan in its present situation.  
The door to China had been opened at this point, so Nixon did not have to intervene in 
the South Asia Crisis solely to preserve Yahya as his only channel to the Chinese.  Some 
argued that the United States had no legal obligation to Pakistan under CENTO in the 
South Asia Crisis.
231
  Pakistan’s Major General Nawabzada Agha Mohammad Raza, 
Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, called on Joseph Sisco to again request help 
based on the 1959 bilateral treaty.
232
  Raza appealed to American willingness to help 
Pakistan in its hour of need, and to avoid “specific treaty commitments which might be 
subject to differing interpretations.”
233
  Raza said that, “We depend on you entirely.”
234
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He understood the U.S. could not provide manpower, but that it could supply armaments, 
“either directly or indirectly via third countries.”
235
  Raza presented an aide-memoire to 
Sisco that stated: “Pakistan fully appreciates the political support given to her by 
President Nixon and the administration, but because of deep and open Soviet 
involvement, mere political support is not enough.”
236
   
In spite of repeated appeals by Pakistan, Nixon and Kissinger could make no 
promise to Yahya that the U.S. would intervene with military aid.  Due to Congressional 
restraints Nixon could not directly assist Pakistan militarily and establish a balance of 
power in South Asia which would help insure peace in the region.  In addition, Nixon 
may have had no desire to become involved to that degree in order to protect détente by 
not risking his diplomatic gains with the Russians.  Nixon limited U.S. alliance 
obligations to intense diplomatic efforts to end India’s war against Pakistan.  Nixon did 
have arrangements underway to provide military equipment for Pakistan through 
intermediaries, but he was bound by law not to send American military aid to Pakistan.  
George H.W. Bush, Permanent Representative to the United Nations (February 1971 - 
January 1973), negotiated with Russian and Indian representatives to end hostilities.  
Zulfikar Bhutto of Pakistan became Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime 
Minister to Yahya Khan during the South Asia Crisis.  Together Bush and Bhutto worked 
in the United Nations Security Council to get an immediate cease-fire in East Pakistan, 
and the withdrawal of Indian forces.  The Russians used their veto in the U.N. to block 
any actions taken against India, and China voted in favor of Pakistan on resolutions 
related to the war with India.   







Pakistan had no chance militarily against a Soviet-sponsored Indian assault.  
Nixon realized that all of Pakistan could soon fall unless the U.S. or China intervened.  
He understood that an ominous shadow loomed over détente due to Indian and Soviet 
actions in South Asia.  By December 5, Nixon and Kissinger saw that it was necessary to 
take a stand of some kind to confront the Soviet Union, or the Russians would be 
emboldened by the implication of American weakness in future Third World conflicts.  In 
a telephone conversation with the President, Kissinger remarked that, “This is going to be 
a dress rehearsal for the Middle East in the spring.”
237
  If the U.S. acquiesced to the 
Soviets as they armed India, and then allowed the Indians to rampage through Pakistan, 
the Soviets would also sponsor similar activities in the Middle East soon afterward.  If the 
U.S. did not take a tough stand, West Pakistan would fall, and a similar attempt would be 
made by the Soviets against Israel using a Soviet-sponsored country (Egypt and/or Syria) 
in the Middle East.   
Détente became threatened by the South Asia Crisis due to Gandhi’s belligerence 
and the Soviet Union’s aggressiveness.  In the beginning, Nixon’s silence on Yahya 
Khan’s atrocities caused the rift between Nixon and Gandhi.  Nixon’s channel to China 
had been secured before India invaded East Pakistan in November, and the loss of Yahya 
as a channel to the Chinese was no longer the threat to détente.  The threat to détente 
came through the crisis itself when India learned of Kissinger’s secret visit to China, and 
Nixon’s planned visit to China the following year.  Unaligned India became anxious 
about a U.S. and China alliance supporting Pakistan, and India immediately aligned with 
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the Russians.  Gandhi’s plans to invade East Pakistan were already in place, but they 
could not succeed unless she had a superpower ally that both the U.S. and China feared.  
Détente was threatened by the Soviet/Indian alliance and its determination to bring 
Pakistan to its knees.  Nixon had to defend West Pakistan to maintain U.S. integrity and 
to protect the global balance of power.  Détente was endangered by a potential military 
confrontation between the great nations of the Cold War era during the South Asia Crisis.  
The Russians had gained a strategic advantage in which they could probe for weakness in 
American resolve, and humiliate both the Americans and the Chinese if they allowed 
Pakistan to fall. 
Nixon and Kissinger were certain that India would invade West Pakistan.  India 
had goaded Pakistan into a war that Gandhi wanted.  She had U.S. Congressional 
restraints against Nixon helping Pakistan, the international community supported her, the 
Soviets had given her massive assistance, her military was superior to Pakistan’s, and she 
would have a significant portion of Yahya’s troops in custody once East Pakistan fell.  
The international community would not reprimand her for crushing Yahya’s military all 
across West Pakistan after it had committed atrocities upon the Bengali people.  India 
would appear justified and even heroic in destroying the army that had tried to destroy 
the Bengali people.  The historic bitterness between India and Pakistan made it 
unreasonable to conclude that India would show any degree of mercy toward its ancient 
enemy when it could permanently remove the threat of further war with Pakistan.  
Gandhi possessed a political and military opportunity to crush its historic enemy that no 
83 
 
Indian leader could ever hope for again.
238
  Kissinger’s intelligence reports confirmed 
that Gandhi would not let the opportunity pass. 
Nixon and Kissinger liked to think of themselves as foreign relations experts who 
could solve Cold War problems, but the South Asia Crisis showed they were continually 
on the verge of losing control of détente’s ultimate destiny.  The crisis proved to be 
anything but a regular situation that the two professional statesmen could handle with 
poise and tact.  Nixon and Kissinger were constantly thwarted by Gandhi’s refusal to 
negotiate for peace and her support of the Bengali guerilla fighters.  Kissinger’s warning 
that Gandhi was on her own against China if she invaded Pakistan was supposed to be the 
political move that would end the crisis, but it created a stubborn determination in India 
to persist in its goals.  India’s treaty with the Soviets put Nixon and his Assistant for 
National Security Affairs on the defensive.  The war between India and Pakistan created 
Cold War tensions between the great nations, and could have been a way for the Soviets 
to communicate to Nixon that Kissinger’s visit to China would not intimidate them.
239
  
The aggressiveness of the Soviet Union during the South Asia Crisis threatened to end 
détente before it could begin. 
Nixon knew it was time to take action.  He could remain silent no longer where 
the Soviet Union was concerned.  Failure to do so would imply significant American 
weakness which would make the Soviets impossible to negotiate with.  In order for 
détente to be successful the balance of power between the great nations had to be 
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  Unless the U.S. could begin détente as a nuclear power with the 
principled determination and courage of a great leader behind it, détente would fail.  
Nixon would have to take a bold stand against the Soviet Union if he was to save détente 
as the South Asia Crisis reached its most crucial point, even though his hands were tied 
as he sought to assist Yahya Khan militarily.  Nixon was already negotiating the SALT 1 
treaty with the Soviet Union and plans for a spring summit in Moscow were on the table.  
His presidential visit to China was only two months away.  Soviet opportunism in South 
Asia proved to be antagonistic and subversive as détente hung in the balance.  The South 
Asia Crisis would ultimately reveal to what lengths Nixon would go in order to protect 
détente.
241
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DÉTENTE BRINGS AN END TO THE SOUTH ASIA CRISIS 
 
Nixon Risks Détente and Warns the Soviet Union that  
He Intends To Intervene on Behalf of Pakistan 
 
Convinced that the Indian/Soviet objective was to defeat and cripple all of 
Pakistan, the Nixon administration decided to take aggressive steps to bring about an 
immediate ceasefire and maintain the territorial integrity of West Pakistan.  Short of these 
steps, the Soviets would not only humiliate China for failing to come to the aid of 
Pakistan, but the U.S. would be humiliated as well for failing to help an ally militarily at 
a time when its very existence was threatened.  It was clear that East Pakistan would fall, 
and the new nation of Bangladesh would result, but Nixon and Kissinger were convinced 
that the U.S. had to protect West Pakistan from falling.  Failure to do so would threaten 
détente by demonstrating that Soviet ambition was beyond restraint, and it would damage 
the integrity of U.S. alliances worldwide.  Détente had given the U.S. a means by which 
to work directly with the Soviet Union and China, but the South Asia Crisis placed Nixon 
in a situation where he needed to negotiate détente during the heat of an escalating war.  
The potential for mistrust and suspicion significantly increased in this wartime scenario, 
and having to use a confrontational tone in his dealings with the Indians and the Soviets 
would threaten to derail détente as well.   
86 
 
The South Asia Crisis revealed the lengths to which Nixon would go in order to 
protect détente and why.  Beginning with an aide-memoire from the Kennedy 
administration, Nixon sought to leverage Indian and Soviet restraint by warning of his 
intention to enter the war on behalf of Pakistan.  As Nixon warned the Russians of his 
plans to intervene should India threaten to invade West Pakistan, he also requested China 
to move some of its military forces to feint a joint U.S./Chinese intervention.  This 
created the problem of potentially escalating the crisis should the Soviets become defiant 
and stiffen in their resolve.  If the Soviets moved against China due to a Chinese move 
against India, Nixon would have to step in and assist China in some way lest he sacrifice 
Kissinger’s diplomatic gains.  Any move the U.S. made against the Soviets to protect 
détente with the Chinese, would threaten détente with the Soviets.  As the South Asia 
Crisis became a complicated Cold War contest, Nixon took a stand based on the principle 
that American weakness was not the reason he desired détente. 
Nixon’s actions during the South Asia Crisis proved his willingness to risk 
détente.  Gandhi had waged a successful lightening war against Pakistan similar to the 
Israeli campaign of 1967, and Yahya’s East Pakistani forces surrendered quickly due to 
overwhelming Indian/Soviet force.  India and the Russians then needed to determine 
whether to accept their gains in the eastern portion of Pakistan as sufficient, or commit to 
war in West Pakistan.  Nixon pressed the Soviets to rein in the Indian military in order to 
preserve the integrity of West Pakistan under threat of U.S. intervention.  Nixon moved 
his naval forces toward the conflict and placed détente at risk.  The Soviet power play 
during the South Asia Crisis would determine if détente with the Soviets was possible.  
Nixon had to maintain the balance of power during the Cold War or détente could not 
87 
 
succeed.  If Russian ambition caused the disintegration of Pakistan by India, and the U.S. 
did not act, the Soviets would believe they could have détente and free rein in the Third 
World as well.  Nixon had to prove to the Russians that he would not abandon an ally for 
the sake of détente.  Peace at all costs was not an option because it signaled American 
weakness to an opponent that considered force to be the key to political success.   
Détente brought an end to the South Asia Crisis.  Nixon believed he could corral 
the Soviets using their own desire to protect their détente interests.  As a result, Nixon 
gambled with détente, SALT 1, and the 1972 summit meeting in Moscow.   Nixon had to 
risk détente based on principle, and communicate to the Russians that the U.S. would not 
tolerate further Soviet ambition at Pakistan’s expense.  If the Soviet Union viewed 
détente as a political expedient caused by American weakness then it could not succeed.  
Nixon would have to use the threat of force in order to remain a credible opponent and 
protect American Cold War interests.  Moscow hoped to save détente for a variety of 
reasons.  Soviet détente interests included grain sales from the U.S., avoiding a 
U.S./Chinese alliance against it, negotiating troop levels in Europe, and limiting the 
American nuclear arsenal.
242
  When Nixon made it clear that he would not tolerate Indian 
and Soviet aggression for the sake of détente, the Soviet Union reined in the Indian 
military and preserved the integrity of West Pakistan.  The Russians ended the South 
Asia Crisis in order to protect their interests in détente, and détente brought an end to the 
South Asia Crisis. 
As the South Asia Crisis expanded into West Pakistan and war in the east ended, 
Nixon needed to deal directly with the Russians if he hoped to end hostilities.  Nixon had 
allowed India to arm the Mukti Bahini and train them for war in East Pakistan.  He also 
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had implied a degree of American weakness as India crossed Pakistan’s border to assist 
in the defeat of Yahya’s forces while America watched.  Nixon had warned India that 
going to war with Pakistan would have serious consequences in U.S./Indian relations, but 
the only bite in his words was the threat of suspending all U.S. aid to India.  Kissinger 
told the President, “What we are seeing here is a Soviet-Indian power play to humiliate 
the Chinese and also somewhat us.”
243
  Kissinger added, “…our only hope in my 
judgment…is to become very threatening to the Russians and tell them that if they are 
going to participate in the dismemberment of another country, that will affect their whole 
relationship to us.”
244
  Nixon needed a way to convince the Russians that he was a tough 
and courageous leader, and that he would risk détente if necessary to get the Soviets to 
rein in India.  Threats to India would accomplish nothing unless the Soviets would 
cooperate. 
Nixon had to convince the Soviets that he would enter the war on behalf of 
Pakistan if India did not show restraint.  He devised a strategy based on an “aide-
memoire” from the years of the Kennedy administration.  In November 1962, the U.S. 
Ambassador to Pakistan, Walter P. McConaughy, had met with Ahub Khan, promising 
U.S. assistance in the form of a telegram that McConaughy handed to Ayub.
245
  The aid-
memoire read, “The government of the United States of America reaffirms its previous 
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assurances to the Government of Pakistan that it will come to Pakistan’s assistance in the 
event of aggression from India against Pakistan””
246
  At the time, the aide-memoire was 
meant to divert concerns by Pakistan that the U.S. had supported India militarily in 1962 
against the Chinese.  This document became the instrument that Nixon used with the 
Soviet Union in the South Asia Crisis in order to restrain their ambitions.   
Nixon and Kissinger agreed to use the Kennedy pledge to warn the Soviets of a 
clear U.S. obligation to aid Pakistan against Indian attack.  On December 10, Kissinger 
was scheduled to meet with Yuli M. Vorontsov, Minister of the Soviet Embassy in the 
United States.  Kissinger explained, “I’m going to show him the Kennedy 
understanding,” and “I’m going to hand him a very tough note to Brezhnev and say this is 
it now…let’s get a cease fire.”
247
  The U.S. would concede that India had won East 
Pakistan, but if India and the Soviets made hostile moves against West Pakistan, Nixon 
wanted the Soviets to understand the U.S. would be obligated to intervene.  A letter from 
Nixon to Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev explained that unless there was an 
immediate cease fire in West Pakistan, the U.S. would assume that an act of aggression 
was in progress against all of Pakistan, “a friendly country toward which we have 
obligations.”
248
  Nixon reminded Brezhnev that because of the Soviet/Indian friendship 
treaty the Soviets “have great influence” with the Indians, “and for whose actions you 
must share responsibility.”
249
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It was important for Kissinger to show a united U.S. government to convince the 
Soviets that Nixon’s threat to intervene was legitimate.  Kissinger’s emphasized to 
Vorontsov the Kennedy promise to help Pakistan against India.
250
  He showed him the 
treaty and said, “…now I hope you understand the significance of this.  It isn’t just and 
obligation.  It will completely defuse the Democrats because they are not going to attack 
their own President.”
251
  Kissinger meant that Congress would support Nixon because 
Kennedy was a Democratic president and the Democrats in Congress would not oppose 
alliance agreements by Kennedy.  The message to Vorontsov was intended to imply that 
all Congressional opposition to Nixon’s policies would disappear if Nixon deiced to 
intervene.  Kissinger warned Vorontsov that when President Nixon spoke of an 
obligation to Pakistan “he was speaking of the Kennedy obligation.”
252
  Vorontsov’s 
conversation with Kissinger would be communicated to Moscow immediately.  Kissinger 
told Nixon that after his meeting, “Vorontsov had needed no further proof of United 
States resolve.”
253
  Kissinger later explained to Nixon that “When I showed Vorontsov 
the Kennedy treaty they knew they were looking down the gun barrel.”
254
  Nixon asked, 
“Did he react?”
255
  Kissinger replied, “Oh yeah.”
256
   
Nixon believed that if the Indians and Soviets saw a combined military movement 
by both the U.S. and the Chinese that suggested a defense of West Pakistan, it would 
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restrain them enough to get a ceasefire.  In conjunction with the Vorontsov conversation 
Nixon requested that Kissinger ask the Chinese to move some forces.
257
  Nixon believed 
it was important for the Chinese to move something militarily to secure a ceasefire.  He 
told Kissinger to have them do “some symbolic act” like moving a military division, or 
something even simpler would be sufficient like moving some trucks or flying some 
planes.
258
  Nixon also ordered a U.S. aircraft carrier task force to move into the Bay of 
Bengal to frighten both India and the Soviets.  It was Nixon’s desire to present the 
likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese alliance moving against the Soviet Union if the Russians 
and Indians did not agree to a ceasefire.   
Nixon’s decision to gamble with détente revealed that he was willing to 
jeopardize diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and sacrifice détente if necessary.    
Both Nixon and Brezhnev wanted to keep détente intact, and both desired to follow 
through on their plans for a Moscow summit in the spring of 1972, but Soviet actions in 
the South Asia Crisis were unacceptable and jeopardized all détente plans.  Nixon 
observed that “If Brezhnev does not have the good judgment not to push us to the wall on 
this miserable issue…we just may as well forget the summit” (SALT 1).
259
  Nixon and 
Kissinger also discussed the fact that the Soviets had sent notes to Iran and Turkey and 
other countries with veiled threats if they should help Pakistan.
260
  Nixon gambling with 
détente in order to get tough with the Soviets showed that détente required the Soviets to 
respect political boundaries.  They could not trample on an American ally without 
                                                          
257
 “Editorial Note,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976 Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, 





 “Editorial Note,” Foreign Relations of the United States, Document 268. 
260
 “Editorial Note,” Foreign Relations of the United States, Document 266. 
92 
 
endangering their own détente interests.  By presenting the Kennedy aide-memoire, 
Nixon himself had placed détente at risk, demonstrating to the Soviets that their 
manipulation of the South Asia Crisis had negative consequences to Soviet interests.  The 
Russians could not expect to have détente with the U.S. and rampage through West 
Pakistan at the same time. 
Nixon believed that the Russians would not escalate the South Asian war to the 
point where they might lose the opportunities presented to them by détente.  As ceasefire 
negotiations were underway Nixon communicated to Brezhnev on December 12 that 
“time is of the essence to avoid consequences neither of us want.”
261
  It was clear that the 
Indians and the Soviets would seize East Pakistan, but Nixon and Kissinger had 
calculated that the Soviets would settle for the gains made in East Pakistan, and agree to a 
ceasefire before invading West Pakistan in order to protect their interests in détente.  
Kissinger told Nixon that he believed the Russians would not drive India to the extreme 
in Pakistan, “because after all they already got 60% of the population of Pakistan.”
262
  
Nixon said that he agreed.
263
  The American threat of military intervention on behalf of 
Pakistan might not have been enough of a deterrent to the Soviets by itself, but potential 
Soviet gains through détente with the Americans was not something the Soviets wanted 
to sacrifice too quickly.   
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As the Soviet Union pondered their response to Nixon’s presentation of the 
Kennedy aide-memoire, a potential problem arose regarding the Chinese.  Kissinger 
feared that if the Chinese made an aggressive move toward India it could “stiffen the 
Russians,” instead of causing them to back down.
264
  The Soviets could decide to take 
aggressive action against China in defense of India.  This would cause the stakes to rise 
significantly by increasing tension between Cold War superpowers.  When Kissinger 
suggested to Huang Hua on December 10 that the Chinese consider military assistance 
for Pakistan,
265
 there was the very real possibility he would get it.  Then Alexander Haig 
interrupted a meeting in the Oval Office between Nixon and Kissinger on December 12, 
to announce that the Chinese wanted an urgent meeting.
266
  They believed that the 
Chinese were going to move militarily on behalf of West Pakistan.  Nixon’s dilemma was 
how the U.S. would respond to a Soviet move against China.  Haig was designated to 
travel to New York to meet the Chinese as Nixon and Kissinger planned to leave for the 
Azores for meetings with the French.  All believed that the Chinese would do as 
Kissinger had suggested, and feign a joint U.S./Chinese military move to protect West 
Pakistan.  It was too late to call off the Chinese for fear of Russian moves against China 
without losing U.S. diplomatic gains with the Chinese, so Haig was instructed to tell the 
Chinese that if the Soviets threatened China for moving against India the U.S. “would not 
ignore Soviet intervention.”
267
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Nixon believed that if the Chinese moved against India on behalf of Pakistan, it 
would greatly increase the likelihood of Indian/Soviet restraint, but if the Soviets 
hardened their resolve and moved against China militarily as a result then it posed serious 
problems.  Kissinger said to Nixon regarding the possibility of a Soviet move against 
China, “I must warn you, Mr. President, if our bluff is called, we’ll be in trouble.”
268
  If 
the U.S. backed down and refused to assist the Chinese against the Soviets, after China 
had acted at U.S. request, it could ruin all diplomatic efforts begun with China by 
Kissinger in July.  If China’s involvement stiffened Soviet resolve and the U.S. reneged, 
then détente with China would be over.  Kissinger told Nixon and Haig, “If the Soviets 
move against them (China) and then we don’t do anything, we’ll be finished.”
269
  The 
Chinese would feel betrayed and the Soviets would be convinced the Americans were 
weak.  Kissinger added, “If the Russians get away with facing down the Chinese and if 
the Indians get away with licking the Pakistanis…we may be looking down the gun 
barrel.”
270
  Even if the United States were to do something symbolic like go on alert 
militarily, or put a minimum of forces in, or give some bombing assistance to the 
Chinese,
271
 warlike moves would still severely damage détente with the Soviet Union, or 
end it altogether. 
The urgent message from the Chinese was that “China was prepared to support 
the United Nations procedure Kissinger had outlined in the December 10 meeting.”
272
  
Haig’s promise to China of American support against the Soviets was never given 
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because China never moved its forces to threaten India.  The Soviets were given no 
reason to move against China.  Like the Americans, the Chinese promised to support 
diplomatic actions in the United Nations on behalf of Pakistan, and would use their 
influence to restrain the Indians and the Soviets.  Kissinger had recommended to the 
Chinese a joint U.N. strategy in which both nations would call for immediate cease fire 
and withdrawal of forces from East Pakistan, but then would simply settle for an 
immediate cease fire in order to save West Pakistan after the East was lost.
273
  Nixon 
would not need to jeopardize détente with the Soviet Union based on his promise to assist 
China.   
The Soviet Union had made a significant investment in India’s war.  They were 
not going to agree to a ceasefire and walk away from a victory.  The Russians delayed 
their agreement to Nixon’s demand for a ceasefire based on the Kennedy aide-memoire 
until the Indians had obtained the surrender of Yahya’s forces in East Pakistan and 
secured their victory.  An exchange of communications between Nixon and Brezhnev 
which promised a quick Soviet response to Nixon’s demands for a ceasefire and 
withdrawal was essentially a stalling tactic by the Soviets.  These responses by the 
Soviets were merely meant to buy time as the Indians pressed their victory to its 
inevitable conclusion.  The Soviet Union then used its influence with India to put an end 
to the South Asia Crisis in order to protect Soviet interests in détente.   
As the Indian military invaded East Pakistan to assist the Mukti Bahini, Yahya’s 
military forces were severely outmatched and gathered around major cities such as Dacca 
for defense and soon began to negotiate for cessation of hostilities.  Kissinger told Nixon 
on December 10 that “the war in the East has reached its final stages,” and “Indian forces 





are encircling Dacca and preparing the final assault” on Yahya’s forces.
274
  Kissinger 
explained that the top Pakistani military official in Dacca had offered terms for a 
ceasefire.  Pakistani Lieutenant General Ameer Abdullah Khan Niazi, requested an 
urgent meeting with the U.S. Consul General in Dacca, Herbert D. Spivack, on December 
14.
275
  Niazi said that the bombing of his forces in Dacca “had convinced him that the 
fighting must be stopped immediately to prevent further bloodshed...”
276
  Niazi offered 
terms which, if met, would result in the immediate end of all Pakistani military operations 
in East Pakistan.   
The surrender of Niazi’s forces in East Pakistan signaled the turning point of the 
war.  It allowed Indira Gandhi to move her East Pakistan forces to West Pakistan and 
continue her campaign if she desired.  The crucial question after India and the Mukti 
Bahini defeated Niazi would be the degree of Indian and Soviet ambition in West 
Pakistan.  Nixon knew that the South Asia Crisis could end, or the real war could begin 
as India and the Soviets invaded West Pakistan and challenged its alliance with the U.S. 
and China.  Once the eastern wing of Pakistan had been defeated, and Yahya’s forces in 
Dacca were in Indian custody, the Soviets used their influence with the Indian 
government to prevent an assault on West Pakistan.  The Soviets persuaded the Indians to 
agree to a ceasefire.   West Pakistan remained secure.  Once Indian forces secured East 
Pakistan and an independent Bangladesh was guaranteed, the South Asia Crisis ended as 
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suddenly as it had begun.  India did not pursue further military objectives in West 
Pakistan.   
When the war ended on December 16, 1971, Indira Gandhi announced “that the 
Pakistani forces commanded by General Niazi had surrendered unconditionally…in 
Dacca.”
277
  She proclaimed it “the free capital of a free country,” and “announced a cease 
fire on the front between India and West Pakistan to take effect the following day.”
278
  
Her government stated that “India had no territorial ambitions in the conflict.”
279
  At the 
same time, India announced that it “expected there would be a “corresponding immediate 
response” from Pakistan.”
280
  Pakistan accepted the ceasefire offer and the South Asia 
Crisis was over. 
The Soviets had humiliated China and the U.S. by the inability of Yahya Khan 
and his superpower allies to prevent the fall and seizure of East Pakistan.  The Russians 
had successfully defeated Yahya’s forces in the eastern wing of his country by arming 
India.  The Soviets had also gained significant political credibility in the Third World as 
an ally that could get the job done in wartime situations.  On the other hand, Nixon’s 
stand against Indian and Soviet aggression using the Kennedy pledge had brought the 
desired result.  His willingness to gamble with the future of détente had caused the 
Russians to back down in order to protect their détente interests.  To Nixon’s credit, 
Kissinger mentioned that Chou En-lai, the Chinese Premier, would later tell Zulfikar Ali 
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Bhutto of Pakistan that it was his judgment that U.S. actions during the South Asia Crisis 
“had saved West Pakistan.”
281
   
When it came to U.S. intervention in South Asia the Soviets may have understood 
that Nixon was bluffing, but to call his bluff would be to sacrifice détente.  The Russians 
were held responsible for emboldening the Indians and aggravating Cold War tensions.  
If India and its Soviet support base would have invaded West Pakistan once Yahya’s 
armies in the east were defeated, it could have triggered a Cold War military engagement 
between all three superpowers that would transcend South Asia.  It would also have 
killed détente and all potential Soviet gains.  It was therefore in Soviet interests to accept 
the gains they had already made, and to keep the summit plans intact for Nixon and 
Brezhnev in 1972.  Without remorse or apology, the Indians and Soviets ceased 
aggressive actions against Pakistan.  Soviet gains were accepted by the Americans, and 
the Soviets did not hold resentment against Nixon for threatening to intervene on behalf 
of Pakistan.  Based on mutual self-interest, both sides understood that détente would 
continue as planned in spite of the South Asia Crisis.  As if the South Asia Crisis were 
nothing more than a simple game of chess, Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet ambassador to 
Washington, “repeated an earlier suggestion that Kissinger make a secret visit to Moscow 
so that Vietnam and other agenda items could be discussed with Brezhnev before the 
summit.”
282
   
In the aftermath of the South Asia Crisis, Kissinger convinced Nixon that it was 
necessary to take steps in the U.N. to preserve the Cold War balance of power.  If 
Nixon’s threat to intervene militarily on behalf of Pakistan based on the Kennedy aide-
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memoire was not reinforced with an emotional display and public anger at India/Soviet 
behavior it could make U.S. resolve appear unconvincing.  After the Soviets backed 
down and agreed to work toward an immediate ceasefire, Kissinger believed that 
registering American outrage in a highly public format could give pause to the Soviets in 
the future.  He realized the U.S. needed to maintain a tough Cold War image to maintain 
the balance of power.  It was not enough for the U.S. to concede that India and the Soviet 
Union had gained East Pakistan, without making public proclamations to oppose it.  The 
Nixon administration wanted to register its outrage at Indian and Soviet ambition.  
Kissinger believed that “if the United States was to ease up on the pressure on India and 
the Soviet Union “we’ve had it.””
283
  He recommended to Nixon that it was time “to turn 
the screw another half turn.”
284
  Kissinger wanted the U.S. to make strong resolutions in 
the United Nations to go on record as condemning India,
285
 but he told Nixon, “We are 
doing this Mr. President with no cards whatsoever,”
286
 indicating that if the Soviets 
became belligerent toward American criticism and pushed back, the U.S. would again be 
in a difficult political position.  Yet, Kissinger felt it was necessary to publicly register 
American outrage in order to sway public opinion against the Indians and the Soviets to 
curb future Soviet ambitions.   
The Nixon administration took a tough stand on India in the United Nations, 
demanding an immediate cease fire and withdrawal of Indian military forces,
287
 as well as 
strongly condemning India’s actions in the crisis.  The U.S. naval fleet would move 
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toward Karachi in West Pakistan
288
 in order to establish that U.S. intervention was still a 
possibility even after hostilities ended.  By going on record in the U.N. as strongly 
condemning India,
289
 the U.S. would maintain a tough posture with the hope that the 
Soviets would be intimidated and therefore less likely to push their agenda too 
aggressively in the coming months.  The U.N. actions were primarily for the public 
record because Nixon and Kissinger had already agreed to accept a simple ceasefire after 
East Pakistan had been defeated.  In a telegram from U.S. Ambassador Keating, he 
“reported that rumors of possible U.S. involvement in the Indo-Pak war were circulating 
in India.  He asked for authorization to offer assurances that the United States did not 
intend to support Pakistan with U.S. arms or equipment.”
290
  Kissinger replied, “Keating 
is to give no such assurances.”
291
  This prohibition by Kissinger kept the Indians and the 
Russians guessing as to U.S. intentions, and gave the U.S. the political initiative.       
Henry Kissinger’s book White House Years presents a picture of Nixon and 
Kissinger as taking a heroic stand against Soviet and Indian aggression.   Yet, in a 
telephone conversation on December 17, Kissinger said to Nixon, “We have come out of 
this amazingly well and we scared the pants off the Russians.”
292
  Kissinger also 
considered the fact that India did not completely devour Pakistan to be “an absolute 
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  The Nixon administration knew that it had relatively little control over the 
outcome of the situation and had taken a bold gamble.  Nixon’s private conversations 
with Kissinger demonstrate surprise at the positive results of the South Asia Crisis where 
American interests were concerned, and indicate the two men had little actual control 
over the end result.  Nixon’s hope that he could usher in the age of détente with his 
diplomatic visits to Peking and Moscow were seriously challenged by the South Asia 
Crisis.  At every turn Nixon and Kissinger found themselves surrounded by unexpected 
problems that threatened détente.  Nixon’s détente goals could have crumbled at any 
moment during the crisis if the Soviet Union pushed back on American resolve to probe 
for signs of weakness that it could exploit.   
The announcement by Indira Gandhi on December 16 of a ceasefire effective in 
all parts of both India and Pakistan, assured the future of West Pakistan.  Yet, Yahya’s 
role as Pakistan’s leader was doubtful.  In the immediate aftermath of the crisis there 
were unanswered questions related to his fate, as well as what would become of Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman, still in prison in West Pakistan.  The Pakistani soldiers under the 
command of General Niazi became prisoners of war in India, with their futures to be 
determined.  The entire Indo/Pak war lasted from November 22, 1971, to December 16, 
which was less than four weeks.  The South Asia Crisis was a brief Cold War episode 
that caught the attention of Nixon and Kissinger only for a short time, but during that 
time the crisis held their full attention as they sought to save détente. 
The episodic character of the Cold War meant that the U.S. did not linger long in 
the various Third World regions where conflict took place.  Once a crisis passed, as in 
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Pakistan, the U.S. would become preoccupied by other issues and seldom consider the 
region again politically to any significant degree.  Yet, if the region became a Cold War 
stage once again, as when Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq assisted the U.S. in combating 
communist advance during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, then the U.S. 
would turn its attention there once more.  Apart from these Cold War episodes, the U.S. 
did not engage in significant foreign policy endeavors in the Third World unless there 
were substantial economic resources to be gained such as oil.  The United States had no 
significant interest in Pakistan after the diplomatic bridge to China had been created and 
the South Asia Crisis had passed.  American diplomatic actions during the Cold War 
followed a “get in and get out” strategy that was wholly dependent on where the greatest 
threats of communist advance or activity existed in the world.   
When Bhutto became the President of Pakistan in December 1971, he was 
anxious about Pakistan’s weakened state, and presented an invitation to the U.S. that was 
meant to help him find the security Pakistan needed.  In March 1972, Pakistan offered the 
U.S. an opportunity to utilize the seaports and land-based facilities of Pakistan for U.S. 
military purposes.
294
  Pakistan remained deeply concerned over the intentions of the 
Soviets and the Indians after the war, and Bhutto felt that a U.S. military presence inside 
Pakistan “could bolster up its defenses in order to provide some credible deterrent.”
295
  
To Bhutto’s disappointment, the U.S. had no political interest in Pakistan after the war 
that could justify a military presence there.  American interests overseas revolved around 
a series of Cold War episodes such as the Vietnam War or Arab/Israeli conflicts in the 
                                                          
294
 “Telegram 2213 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, March 10, 1972, 0725Z,” 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976 Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972, 






Middle East.  During the Cold War the U.S. had no interest in maintaining a military 
presence in Pakistan strictly for Pakistan’s sake.   
The Cold War interests of the U.S. would cause its leaders to focus attention on 
Pakistan periodically, but when these episodes ended, the attention that America gave to 
the nation of Pakistan ended as well.  As the South Asia Crisis diminished, Nixon would 
make plans for his historic visits to Peking and Moscow.  Kissinger’s talents would be 
redirected to concentrate more on other areas such as Vietnam peace negotiations in 
Paris.  Kissinger’s skills were needed elsewhere, and former Secretary of the Treasury, 
John B. Connally, became a key Nixon liaison to South Asia.  The U.S. would not take 
significant notice of Pakistan again until Bhutto sought to arm his country against India 
with nuclear weapons in the mid 1970s.      
In post-crisis Pakistan, U.S. relations remained positive.  The U.S. did not come 
to Pakistan’s aid militarily when India attacked, but Pakistan knew that Nixon faced 
Congressional restraints from doing so.  Nixon and Kissinger had done everything 
possible where the U.N. was concerned, and had gone so far as to assist Pakistan in 
gaining military aircraft from third nations.  Nixon’s tilt toward Pakistan was not a secret 
when it came to the international arena, and Bhutto did not accuse Nixon of abandoning 
or betraying Pakistan during the South Asia Crisis.  Bhutto thanked Nixon for supporting 
Pakistan throughout the war and condemning India’s actions.   
As president of Pakistan, Bhutto was a civilian leader rather than a military 
leader.  Bhutto had been elected by a majority in West Pakistan during the December 
1970 elections, and since East Pakistan no longer existed, Bhutto’s majority in the west 
made him the legitimate civil authority of the country.  He ended martial law and 
104 
 
instituted a new constitution as his Pakistan People’s Party took the reins of power.  
Pakistan had been under military rule for thirteen years, but under Bhutto the country 
experienced its first democratically elected civilian leader since Ayub Khan came to 
power in a military coup in 1958.  During the Bhutto presidency U.S.-Pakistan relations 
were cordial, but were often unstable due to Bhutto’s impulsive and unpredictable nature.  
His western education gave him strong leanings toward democracy as a political structure 
for Pakistan.  Unlike Yahya, Bhutto was highly intelligent and a shrewd politician.  
Bhutto was considered to be a political leftist.
296
  He was hot-tempered and pugnacious.  
If he felt slighted, he could be vindictive.  Bhutto had “denounced the Ayub Khan regime 
as a dictatorship and was subsequently imprisoned”
297
 in 1968-69 before he became 
president.   
Addressing the issue of Mujibur Rahman and securing the release of Pakistan’s 
prisoners of war after the South Asia Crisis fell to Bhutto.  He and Mujib were 
colleagues, and even though they were political opponents they were not enemies.  On 
January 3, 1972, Bhutto announced that Mujibur Rahman would be unconditionally 
released from prison “without commitments or pre-conditions.”
298
  Bhutto said that Mujib 
“came to me almost on his knees with tears in his eyes begging for his life and expressing 
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his eternal gratitude for saving his life.”
299
  The kindness Bhutto showed Mujibur 
Rahman after Yahya’s cruelty to him was a significant contrast, but Bhutto faced 
criticism for not receiving solid commitments from Mujib before his release regarding the 
93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war being held by India.  Mujib not only hesitated to 
release the Pakistani prisoners of war, he also threatened to hold war crimes trials for 
some of them
300
 based on atrocities committed during the civil war. 
It was Indira Gandhi that held the fate of Pakistan’s prisoners of war in her hands, 
and once again Gandhi tied the release of Pakistani citizens under her control to a 
political goal, just like she had done with the Bengali refugees.  Gandhi said that “she 
could not return”
301
 Pakistani “prisoners of war to augment Pakistan’s war potential until 
she was satisfied as to Pakistan’s peaceful intentions.”
302
  More importantly, Pakistan was 
required to acknowledge the sovereignty of Bangladesh as a precondition for the 
repatriation of Pakistani prisoners of war.  Bhutto said “it was wholly inappropriate for 
India to link the question of the release of prisoners of war with other political issues,”
303
 
and he was outraged that Mujib sought “to try some 1500 prisoners of war for alleged 
“war crimes.””
304
  Pakistan prisoners of war remained captive in India until August 1973.  
Potential war crimes trials were eventually reduced to only 195 of the captives taken by 
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India’s forces when General Niazi had surrendered in Dacca.
305
  With the Indo-Pakistani 
Agreement of August 28, 1973, all prisoners of war were released and repatriated to 
Pakistan.
306
  Bhutto said that once Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh could reach agreement 
on the fates of the 195 individuals being held for war crimes trials, then Pakistan would 
formally recognize the country of Bangladesh and agree to diplomatic relations.
307
  
Pakistan’s official recognition of Bangladesh was announced by Bhutto in February 
1974.
308
  As democracy gained a foothold in Pakistan, America moved on to other Cold 
War episodes. 
Détente could only be effective if the global balance of power were maintained.  
Nixon realized that Indian and Soviet ambition in South Asia could upset the balance of 
power and give the Soviets an advantage in détente negotiations.  Kissinger understood 
that if America did not maintain a hard line against Soviet military support for India as it 
invaded East Pakistan, then it was highly likely the Soviets would repeat their actions 
elsewhere.  Détente had no ability to modify the global ambition of the Soviet Union.  It 
could produce no change of attitude or ideology among Cold War adversaries.  
Throughout the remainder of Nixon’s time in office the Soviet pattern of supplying 
massive armaments to Third World countries that were at war with American allies 
continued.  Soviet backing of a North Vietnamese invasion into South Vietnam in 1972 
and Soviet backing of Egypt and Syria against Israel in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 
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further demonstrated the Cold War ambitions of the Soviet Union.  Nixon later explained, 
“I have never said that the Soviets are “good guys.”  What I have always said is that we 
should not enter into unnecessary confrontations with them.”
309
  Nixon went on to say 
that “the Soviet Union will always act in its own self-interest; and so will the United 
States.  Détente cannot change that.  All we can hope from détente is that it will minimize 
confrontation in marginal areas and provide…alternative possibilities in the major 
ones.”
310
  The Soviet Union believed it had the ideological solution to the needs of the 
world.  In the Marxist/Leninist mind this often involved the necessity of war rather than 
pursuing peace. 
Détente brought an end to the South Asia Crisis because the Soviet Union 
believed détente served Soviet interests more than the dismantling of Pakistan.  The 
Soviet Union remained content with the gains made in the East Pakistan portion of the 
war, and discouraged India from pursuing further ambitions in West Pakistan.  Nixon 
demanded that the Russians use their influence to rein in the Indian military to protect the 
sovereignty of West Pakistan, and the Soviets consented based on their desire to preserve 
their potential gains through détente.  Were it not for détente and the benefits the Soviets 
hoped to receive as a result of their participation and cooperation, the South Asia Crisis 
could have continued until Pakistan was destroyed.  India’s military stopped short of 
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The Episodic Nature of U.S. Relations  
with Pakistan Continues 
 
The South Asia Crisis demonstrated how the U.S. approached the Third World in 
general during the Cold War.  The crisis illustrated the episodic nature of U.S. 
relationships with developing countries.  American Cold War policy in developing 
countries was to pursue and prevent the threat of global communist expansion.  The U.S., 
the Soviet Union, and Communist China aligned themselves with the developing 
countries of the Third World in order to promote their respective political ideologies.  
When these developing countries went to war with one another, the various superpowers 
would back them.  In this way the Third World armies would fight the Cold War battles 
of the great nations as proxies.  America followed potential communist threats around the 
globe incorporating a get-in and get-out strategy of assisting its allies in the Third World.  
These Third World battlefields frequently changed location as nations like the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union engaged each other in various locations in an episodic fashion.  When a 
Soviet or Chinese ally threatened a U.S. ally, the U.S. got in quickly and aggressively, 
but would then move on suddenly and completely to confront new Cold War challenges 
once the threat had been addressed. 
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The South Asia Crisis is a case study of U.S. Cold War relations with the Third 
World.  Nixon became involved in Pakistan in order to secure a diplomatic opening to 
China to begin his détente initiative.  The U.S. had no significant interest in Pakistan 
apart from American Cold War objectives in the region.  Nixon supported a Pakistani 
government that had committed atrocities against its own people during a sudden and 
unexpected civil war.  To protect détente he maintained a public silence where Pakistan 
was concerned.  India and the Soviet Union intervened, leading to the South Asia Crisis 
which threatened détente on various levels.  When Soviet Cold War ambitions became 
too blatant in South Asia, Nixon confronted the Soviets and threatened U.S. intervention 
on behalf of Pakistan.  Nixon and Kissinger did what was necessary to regain control of 
the situation to preserve the Cold War balance of power.  Nixon’s reasons for U.S. 
involvement in Pakistan were to secure diplomatic relations with China and minimize 
Soviet advances in South Asia.  His intervention during the crisis was done for the sake 
of U.S. Cold War interests, and not for Pakistan’s own sake.  Once U.S. Cold War 
objectives in Pakistan had been accomplished, the U.S. diplomatically and politically 
vacated the country, moving on to other regions of the world that were threatened by 
communism.   
The episodic nature of U.S. relations with Pakistan is a pattern America has 
followed since the South Asia Crisis, and presents a picture of U.S. Cold War relations 
with developing countries that continues today.  After the South Asia Crisis, the U.S. 
again became involved in Pakistan during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.  
This episode caused a close U.S. relationship to develop with Pakistani President Zia ul-
Haq during the presidency of Ronald Reagan.  After the Soviet withdrawal from 
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Afghanistan, the U.S. quickly departed the region.  The modern War on Terror has also 
produced a new episode in U.S. relations with Pakistan as President George W. Bush 
recruited Pakistani President Pervez Musharaff to cooperate in the American battle 
against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.    
Maintaining the political stability of Pakistan during an episode of involvement is 
a primary concern to the United States.  Political stability in Pakistan often comes in the 
form of an autocratic dictator backed by the country’s military.  When a military dictator 
can manage to keep Pakistan politically stable, the U.S. will work with him in pursuit of 
American interests because he is the most reliable path to accomplishing American 
objectives.  This was demonstrated in the way that Nixon worked with the military 
regime of Yahya Khan during the South Asia Crisis, overlooking its flaws and propping 
up its authority.  It is also evident in the American alliance with General Zia ul-Haq 
during the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, and with General Pervez Musharaff during the 
modern War on Terror.   
Before the end of the 1970s both Mujibur Rahman and Zulfikar Bhutto were 
murdered by military factions opposed to their governments.  Mujib would become the 
victim of a violent assassination in Bangladesh as he and a large number of his family 
members were slain in August, 1975.  Allegedly, six disgruntled majors along with three 
hundred men under their command acted unilaterally and ended Mujib’s regime.
311
  
Serious doubts arouse as to the unilateral nature of the assassination when the new 
leadership took power soon after.  Two years later, Zulfikar Bhutto would be arrested and 
imprisoned by his senior military commander, General Zia ul-Haq, in July, 1977.  
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Zulfikar’s 24-year-old daughter at the time, Benazir, remembered her mother waking the 
family and calling out, “The army’s taken over, the army’s taken over!”
312
  Zulfikar’s son 
was ready to resist, but his father warned him, “Never resist a military coup.  We must 
give them no pretext to justify our murders.”
313
  Benazir later wrote that she “shuddered 
to think of how Mujib and most of his family had been assassinated in their Dacca home 
two years before.”
314
   
Benazir Bhutto later wrote that, “General Zia is often identified as the person 
most responsible for turning Pakistan into a global center for political Islam,” and he 
“attained power as a result of a mosque-military alliance.”
315
  The Pakistan People’s 
Party under Zulfikar Bhutto carried the slogan of “Bread, Clothing, and Shelter”
316
 for 
all.  Zia allied himself with the Islamists, and in order to court their favor, created the 
motto of “Faith, Piety, and Jihad.”
317
  Zia later charged Zulfikar Bhutto “with a baseless 
crime, and, in the face of worldwide outrage, executed him on April 4, 1979, in what 
leading jurists referred to as a judicial murder.”
318
  This would be the American 
equivalent of General Douglas MacArthur seizing the White House with his forces and 
ordering President Harry S. Truman arrested, tried, and then executed for alleged crimes.  
The assassination of Mujibur Rahman in Bangladesh, and the death of Zulfikar Bhutto in 
Pakistan four years later, marked “the end of an entire era of hopes and illusions 
surrounding the prospects for social democracy in conditions of severe backwardness and 
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  By the end of the 1970s the civilian governments of both Bhutto 
and Rahman had ended.  Pakistan under Zia then experienced an autocratic period of 
military rule.    
The true power in Pakistan has always been the military, and it remains so today.  
Under the Zia regime and using U.S. dollars he reinvented the intelligence agency called 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).  The ISI “is Pakistan’s military equivalent of the Central 
Intelligence Agency” (CIA).
320
  According to the New York Times, American officials 
believe that “the ISI has sometimes functioned as a shadow government” using its ties “to 
drug dealers and Islamic extremists to stir up trouble not only in Pakistan but also in 
Afghanistan.”
321
  The ISI “helped bring the Taliban to power in Afghanistan in the 1990s, 
and many American officials suspect that those ties still are at work.”
322
  After the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Zia partnered with the U.S. to combat the Soviets.  The 
U.S. supported the dictatorship of Zia because he had an organized military that could 
provide the necessary structure in the resistance movement against the Soviet Union.  
America ignored the fact that he had come to power by murdering a democratically 
elected civilian President.   
Concentrating solely on its Cold War objectives, the U.S. abundantly armed the 
anti-Soviet fighters in both Afghanistan and Pakistan through the Zia regime.  Known as 
the mujahedeen, these Pakistani and Afghan freedom fighters aggressively opposed the 
Soviet military and eventually became the Islamist radicals of the 1990s.  Osama Bin 
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Laden was numbered among them as a chieftain.  American support for the mujahedeen 
in the Afghan war with the Soviet Union in 1979 became the next “get in and get out” 
episode in U.S.-Pakistani relations.  When the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from 
Afghanistan in 1989, the U.S. did what it had done after the 1971 South Asia Crisis; 
America pulled out of Afghanistan and Pakistan completely.  Benazir Bhutto, a former 
Pakistani Prime Minister, explained that “the West had abandoned three million Afghan 
refugees and stopped all assistance to them after the Soviets left.”
323
  It is important to 
note that many of these Afghan refugees migrated between Afghanistan and Pakistan, not 
recognizing the border between the two countries.  She also said, “By pulling out of 
Afghanistan in the early 1990s, the United States lost all control over, influence on, and 
intelligence about the radical groups it had financed.  Suddenly, there were thousands of 
U.S.-trained…radical fighters left out in the cold.”
324
  The pattern of America “getting in 
and then getting out” once the crisis had passed is a pattern of U.S. behavior seen 
throughout the Cold War in various places around the world.  General Zia was killed in 
an airplane explosion in August, 1988, paving the way for the Bhutto legacy of 
democracy to return to Pakistan through Zulfikar’s daughter, Benazir.  She would be 
elected twice as Prime Minister of Pakistan.  
Thirty years after the South Asia Crisis, in 2001, the War on Terror replaced the 
Cold War, and once more Pakistan became central to U.S. foreign policy in the battle 
against Al Qaeda.  The U.S. had shown little interest in Pakistan after vacating the 
country once the Soviets had been defeated in Afghanistan, but after 9/11 Pakistan once 
again became central to U.S. foreign policy.  The War on Terror had opened another 
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episode in U.S./Pakistan relations.  General Pervez Musharaff came to power in Pakistan 
in a 1999 military coup.  He became President of Pakistan in June 2001, and held power 
in the country when Osama Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network destroyed the World Trade 
Center towers in New York City.  America recruited the Musharaff government to assist 
the U.S. against Bin Laden and the Taliban in the aftermath of 9/11.   
Developing a viable democracy in Pakistan has been secondary to U.S. security 
interests in the country.  When a legitimate democratic political movement takes shape in 
Pakistan the U.S. will hesitate to support that movement if it jeopardizes the political 
stability of the nation during a national security episode such as the War on Terror.  This 
was the case with Benazir Bhutto.  She returned to Pakistan in October of 2007 to run in 
national elections scheduled to take place the following January.  Like her father, she 
believed in the establishment of a democratic Pakistan.  The U.S. did not support her 
political goals to any significant degree for the sake of protecting its partnership with the 
Musharaff military regime which had become an ally against Al Qaeda and was involved 
in the hunt for Osama Bin Laden.  America’s post 9/11 partnership with Musharaff made 
him the best ally in the War on Terror, and Benazir’s antagonism toward Musharaff’s 
government threatened to upset the stability of the country at a time when the U.S. 
needed political stability intact.   
The U.S. understood that the military establishment held power in Pakistan, and 
Bhutto had previously been ousted from her office as Prime Minister on two occasions.  
Her ability to hold and exercise power in Pakistan was doubtful based on her past 
experience.  “Dismissed twice as Prime Minister, she often complained of being in office 
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but not in power.”
325
  Bhutto found that her popular base was insufficient to oppose a 
firmly entrenched military and religious political hierarchy.  For the U.S. to support 
Bhutto would have been admirable and consistent with democratic values, but it would 
have jeopardized the U.S. alliance with Pakistan in the War on Terror should Bhutto fail.  
America could not risk alienating the Musharaff regime, and needed its help in the hunt 
for Osama Bin Laden.  In 2007 the U.S. was more concerned about its short-term goals in 
the War on Terror than any long-term goals related to a democratic Pakistan. 
Benazir Bhutto became the target of two assassination attempts in the three month 
period prior to elections.  Although Bhutto survived the first assassination attempt in 
October which involved twin bomb blasts and sniper-fire, she did not survive the second 
assassination attempt.  She was killed on December 27, 2007.  Bhutto was assassinated in 
Pakistan before democratic elections could take place.  Rage mounted in the streets and 
President Musharraf called for restraint.
326
  After Bhutto’s assassination Musharaff would 
resign his military commission in order to become a civilian president, a political charade 
designed to bolster his legitimacy in late 2007.  Musharraf would eventually resign his 
office as President in 2008 in the face of impeachment proceedings against him, and 
leave Pakistan to live in London in self-imposed exile.  Asif Ali Zardari, the husband of 
the late Benazir Bhutto, “easily won the September 2008 presidential elections.”
327
   
General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani took charge of the Pakistani military in the wake 
of Musharraf’s resignation and is considered the nation’s most powerful official today.  
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Kayani is a shadow figure looming over Zardari’s administration.  In many ways Zardari 
is in office but not in power, just like his late wife, Benazir, had claimed during her years 
in office.  According to the New York Times, “Although a civilian government led by 
President Asif Ali Zardari is in power…General Kayani makes all the vital strategic 
decisions.”
328
  Forty years after the South Asia Crisis, in May, 2011, America’s most 
notorious public enemy, Osama Bin Laden, was discovered and killed in Pakistan.  The 
American raid into Pakistan that resulted in the death of the Al Qaeda leader enraged the 
Pakistani military.  “Kayani said that he would not tolerate a repeat of such a raid.”
329
  
The incident was considered a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty
330
 in that it took place 
without the prior knowledge of Pakistan’s government.
331
  The raid caused Kayani 
embarrassment over the legitimacy of Pakistan’s security and he had to fight to maintain 
his position.
332
  Questions arose as to how Bin Laden could be living in the military 
garrison city of Abbottabad without the Pakistani military being aware of his presence.  
The fact that the U.S. invaded the Bin Laden compound without first telling the Pakistani 
military of its plans, illustrates that the level of trust existing in U.S./Pakistani relations 
today is very low. 
In the immediate wake of the Bin Laden execution, an unsigned memorandum 
surfaced in Pakistan on October of 2011 requesting the support of the United States “to 
curb the military’s influence and avert a possible coup.”
333
  Kayani demanded a Supreme 
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Court investigation to determine if the memo originated with the Zardari government.
334
  
“Kayani dispelled the speculations of any military takeover,” but stated that “there can be 
no compromise on national security.”
335
  Kayani did little to relieve anxiety over a 
possible coup by the military.
336
  Pakistani ambassador to Washington, Husain Haqqani, 
was the person behind the memorandum which was sent to U.S. Admiral Mike Mullen, 
“just days after Bin Laden was killed in Pakistan.”
337
 “The memo was allegedly an 
attempt to enlist U.S. help to head off a feared military coup”
338
 by Pakistani military 
leaders concerned about national security.  “Zardari reportedly feared that the military 
might seize power in a bid to limit the damaging fallout”
339
 of the Bin Laden 
assassination in Pakistan.  Kayani’s demands left a clear impression about who was in 
charge in Pakistan, and the Zardari government had good reason to be nervous about a 
military coup.  There were multiple precedents for military takeovers of government in 
Pakistan’s history allegedly to restore order and to protect the national security.   
Pakistan has a history of Military/Islamic cooperation since the days of General 
Zia ul-Haq in the 1970s.  Today in Pakistan “many in the lower ranks of the military have 
more sympathy for the militant groups than for the United States.”
340
  The 
Military/Islamic establishment will give a nod to democracy because it understands the 
need to govern with the approval and support of the people based on the Bhutto legacy, 
but both the Pakistani military and the Islamists believe in autocratic rule.  
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Democratically elected civilian leaders are not taken seriously in Pakistan because when 
Pakistan’s generals control the military instead of a civilian president having that 
authority, the generals can intervene and seize political power anytime they choose.  
Some speculate “that the military would prefer to rule without challenge, but behind a 
civilian façade.”
341
  The military establishment in Pakistan has a traditional collusion 
with extreme Islamic elements, and together they pose a consistent threat to democratic 
civilian authority in the country.   
The U.S. maintains its episodic approach to foreign policy in the Third World 
today.  America’s impatience with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and its desire for a 
hasty military withdrawal from both countries demonstrates that the present American 
episode in the War on Terror is coming to an end.  After its military goals in Iraq had 
been achieved, the U.S. evacuated its forces, but continued to address its challenges in 
Afghanistan.  The Afghan war continues to be fought by U.S. troops in an effort to 
contain the possible resurgence of the Taliban and its Islamic terrorist network.  U.S. 
relations with Pakistan are strained due to the American military raid that killed Osama 
Bin Laden, and America has determined to bring U.S. troops home from Afghanistan as 
soon as possible.  U.S. foreign policy related to the War on Terror once more suggests a 
get-in and get-out approach to the Third World by the United States.   
Modern Pakistan in 2012 faces an uncertain future.  The threat of Pakistan’s 
military once again seizing power in the country is an ever-present possibility.  The 
modern civilian government of Asif Ali Zardari faces the possibility of another military 
coup today, which would once more bring Pakistan under the control of an autocratic 
military dictatorship led by Kayani.  Pakistan is considered one of the most dangerous 





places in the world today due to its possession of nuclear weapons, an ongoing unstable 
political situation, and the ubiquitous presence of militant Islam.  If the United States 
follows its historical pattern of evacuating Afghanistan and Pakistan once its military 
goals related to the War on Terror are resolved, then it will embolden Pakistan’s military 
establishment to seize power once more, and it will weaken Pakistan’s civilian 
government.   
If the United States moves on to other concerns, leaving the Afghans and the 
Pakistanis to care for their own problems once America has dealt with its security 
concerns in the region, then the Islamic/Military partnership in Pakistan can only grow 
stronger.  The Islamic extremists will continue to migrate between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan at their leisure, secure in their mountainous terrain, and it will allow them to 
boast that they have beaten the Americans just like they beat the Soviets during the Cold 
War.  If the War on Terror is reduced to just another American wartime episode, a quick 
get-in and get-out strategy, then the Muslim world will maintain its “disillusionment and 
cynicism”
342
 regarding Western democracy.  Military autocracy and Islamic extremism 
will continue to dominate Pakistan.  The South Asia Crisis was short in its duration, but it 
revealed an American tendency to act in an episodic fashion according to its short-term 
interests in Pakistan.  The U.S. has often failed to give adequate regard to long-term 
issues in its relations with Pakistan.  The potential problems that can arise as a result have 
been largely ignored.  In modern times, the evidence suggests that the U.S. continues its 
episodic approach and short-term focus where Pakistan is concerned.   
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